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This thesis is an investigation into the phenomena of 
mental practice, that is the thinking through of a movement, or 
movement sequences prior to actual performance. Using a gross 
motor skill it was demonstrated that it is the sequential, or 
cognitive component of the task that is most affected by- 
mental practice, rather than the execution of the movements 
themselves.
As a result of enhanced sequence learning overall 
performance does improve. Further experiments revealed that 
individuals can produce . novel movement sequences without prior 
physical practice of the task. Subjects demonstrated the 
ability to produce such sequences as long as they have 
information about the order and types of movements to be 
performed.
Finally, an attempt was made to characterise the individual 
differences that might be associated with the capacity to use 
mental practice effectively. The literature on mental practice 
reveals that imagery may be a factor within this context, A 
test of imagery was designed, and its validity and reliability 
established. This test was used to screen subjects prior to 
participation in a mental practice study. Unfortunately, no 
significant relationship was found between imagery, as 
measured by the test, and improved performance on the task. 
There was however, a correlation between test scores and the 
rate of initial learning.
The experimental results are discussed in terms of two 
proposals. The first is the relationship between mental 
practice and symbolic learning theory. The second is the 
possible role of such practice in the preparation of motor 
programs prior to performance.
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Recent trends in the study of movement skills have 
emphasised the cognitive activities of the learner. Just as 
individuals can perform mental arithmetic, so too can they 
engage in 'mental movement', to solve a problem, or gain a new 
skill. The motor aspects of action are the articulation of the 
skeleton by the contraction of muscles, however, such activity 
is only a small part of the movement production system. 
Other processes also play an essential role in skilled 
performance, these include the selection and planning of 
actions. Prior to planning the learner must have knowledge 
about both the environment and the goal to be achieved. 
Reference will then be made to a long-term memory store which 
contains the general characteristics of the individual's past 
movement experiences. This information is constantly being 
updated and reorganised as new data about the relationships 
between actions and outcomes are acquired through experience.
Once the individual has knowledge about the conditions in 
which performance is demanded, a novel movement instance, or 
motor program will be generated which selects the specific 
actions necessary to achieve the desired goal. This 
information is thought to be represented at its highest level 
in the form of 'cognitive entities', or movement plans, and it 
might be reasonable to assume that such entities can be 
manipulated by purely psychological processes which do not 
necessarily involve concommitant muscular activity. Although 
behaviourally silent at the time of acquisition, the effect of 
such cognitive manipulation may well be manifest in subsequent
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performance. The present studies are an attempt to influence 
these cognitive processes using mental practice to manipulate 
and restructure motor information which is held at the 
highest level within the movement production system.
In order to appreciate the role of mental practice in the 
context of skill acquisition it will be necessary to briefly 
examine the theories of motor control. The literature on 
mental practice is examined together with comments and 
criticisms. This examination reveals that many previous 
studies of mental practice have been conducted in a 
theoretical vacuum. In Chapter Two a particular theoretical 
stance is adopted, and the problems of experimental procedures 
are discussed. The rationale for the experimental paradigm 
adopted is discussed and the apparatus design is described. 
In Chapter Three the mental practice effect is established and 
an attempt is made to isolate those aspects of skill learning 
which are susceptible to such practice. The remainder of the 
thesis is devoted to the study of individual differences and 
mental practice. The possibility is considered that imagery 
ability may be positively relatedto the mental practice effect, 
and this hypothesis is tested experimentally using a novel 
test of imagery. Finally, there is a statement of the 
conclusions that may be drawn from this work.
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THEORIES OF MOTOR CORTROL
The expression of skilled movement is demonstrated by all 
individuals throughout daily life. In order to produce skilled 
movements, muscles must be activated and coordinated by 
commands from the sensory-motor cortex. Traditionally, there 
are two theoretical approaches which have attempted to explain 
the production and performance of complex movement sequences. 
The first assumes that movement is dependent on sensory 
feedback for both control, and the detection and correction of 
errors, whereas the second argues that movement is programmed 
centrally and can be executed without reference to peripheral 
information. The fundamental question is how do these two 
approaches differ in their explanation of movement control and 
the acquisition of skills. For the sake of clarity, a 
distinction must be made between the mechanisms which control 
movement, and the processes which underlie the acquisition of 
movement. The control of movement can be studied without 
reference to learning, however, learning cannot be accounted 
for without consideration of the mechanisms which control 
movements.
Theories which are based on the notion that motor responses 
are feedback dependant are known as closed loop models of 
motor control. The sensory consequences of the movement 
returns to higher centres to be compared to an internal 
reference, in order to detect errors and correct them on future 
trials. This internal reference of correctness is thought to 
be an abstract image of the feedback associated with the 
appropriate movement. Once this internal standard is
- 3 -
established, it guides responding and detects errors which will 
be corrected during subsequent attempts. Thus learning occurs 
as a result of the performer's increasing ability to update and 
use the internal reference as a checking mechanism for the 
sensory consequences of each performance.
By contrast to this closed loop model is the open loop 
system where movement is not thought to be under constant 
monitoring, but rather directly controlled by central 
mechanisms. This approach to motor control assumes that 
movements are pre-programmed, and furthermore, that such 
programs contain all the information necessary to perform the 
movement. The open loop system is somewhat analogous to a 
computer system where programs can be run-off without 
reference to peripheral mechanisms. In this case, learning can 
occur, either as a result of stimulus response contiguity, or 
the development of motor schema which are based on past 
movement experience. If errors occur this information is 
passed back to a central mechanism where two options are 
possible, first the goal of the movement can be changed, or 
second a particular response can be discarded, and new 
associations can be formed so as to mediate a more appropriate 
response. These two approaches to the control and learning of 
movements have been introduced in terms of response
production. Owing to the complexities of human motor skills,
however, it is essential that the way in which responses are
organised into meaningful sequences should also be considered.
The following is an attempt to present the reader with an 
overview of the theories which have sought to explain motor 
control with specific reference to learning, and consideration
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will be given to closed and open loop models of control in 
this context. It will be apparent that the nature of the skill 
itself will require analysis, as it may be a critical factor in 
determining which system of control meets the demands of the 
task to be performed. Finally, the discussion will focus on 
the way in which the control of movement production is 
organised. The various modes of organisation will be assessed 
in order to justify the aims of the present studies. The 
proposal is that, whatever method of organisation is imposed 
upon responding, it is the sequencing of these responses which 
represents one of the highest levels within the mechanism that 
controls the production of complex movement patterns. If 
mental manipulation of this cognitive component of skilled 
learning results in the improvement of subsequent performance, 
then specific practice of this element, or mental practice, 
may play a crucial role in the acquisition of complex motor 
skills. This proposal will then be related to the various 
modes of organisation that can be imposed on response 
production.
Closed Loop Theories Of Motor Learning
Historically, motor learning has evolved within a 
behaviourist perspective. Thorndike's Law Of Effect simply 
states that, if a response is followed by a reward this will 
lead to a repetition of that response, and punishment will lead 
to the elimination of that response. The rules that accompany 
the Law Of Effect, however, do not always hold true for human 
motor learning. The technique of a highly skilled performer, 
will not disappear simply because reinforcement is either
5 -
delayed, or withdrawn, which is what would be predicted by a 
naive interpretation of Thorndike's Law. In 1971 Adams 
proposed a closed loop theory of motor learning in an attempt 
to overcome this, and other problems that have been 
associated with the traditional S-R theories of learning.
Adam's theory has two distinct features, a perceptual trace 
which controls and monitors movement production, and a memory 
trace which is responsible for the initiation of the movement 
and functions essentially like an S-R association. Once the 
response has started, however, the movement becomes 
independent of the triggering stimulus and is controlled by 
reference to the perceptual trace. This trace acts as a 
reference against which feedback stimuli from the response 
can be compared. The perceptual trace is made up of the 
sensory consequence occurring at the completion of the most 
recent successful response, and the trace will be strengthened 
the more times the subject performs this response. If an error 
should occur the subject will, using knowledge of results, 
ensure that his next response differs from the previous one, 
so its feedback will not match the trace associated with the 
incorrect response. The comparison between the current state 
of feedback from the ongoing response, and the perceptual trace 
of the correct response control the form and termination of 
the action in progress. Adams proposed that during early 
learning subjects rely heavily on knowledge of results and 
verbal mediation, and his model is clearly dependent upon 
sensory information for both the formation of the trace and 
the evaluation of performance during execution.
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Problems With The Closed Loop Model Of Motor Learning
One of the problems with a feedback dependent model, such 
as Adams, is that it has difficulty in accounting for 
movement in the absence of proprioception. One aspect of this 
difficulty is the delay inherent in the proprioceptive feedback 
loop. Information cannot reach control centres fast enough to 
modify a response in progress. Many actions, particularly the 
rapid movements often produced by skilled performers, occur 
faster than the delay inherent in this system (about 200 
msec.). This rate limiting factor has been one of the 
stumbling bocks in all closed loop theories of motor control,
Recent physiological studies have provided evidence that 
may afford a solution to this problem. Such studies have 
revealed that there may be not one, but two feedback loops 
which carry proprioceptive information. The first, a short 
fast loop, the second a slow loop. To account for rapid 
movements in terms of a closed loop model, it is argued that 
there is a closed loop reflexive mechanism in the limbs which 
involves the gamma loop and muscle spindle which operates to 
correct errors during the performance of rapid movements.
Voluntary Movement In The Absence Of 
Proprioceptive Information
Lashley (1917), in his classic study of a patient with 
spinal damage demonstrated that despite the absence of sensory 
feedback from the moving limbs his patient could still make 
voluntary movements with that limb, and furthermore, reproduce 
movements that had previously been passively placed. More 
recently, Taub and Berman (1968) have provided further support
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for Lash ley's findings. Using deaf feren ted monkeys they 
demonstrated that purposeful and coordinated gross body 
movement could be made in the absence of sensory feedback.
V  Fine discreet movements, however, such as picking up small
objects did show some deficits. Taub states that, "once a 
motor program is written into the CHS the specified behaviour 
having been initiated can be performed without any reference 
to guidance from the periphery, moreover, there does not appear
to be any reason why the initiation, the trigger cannot also be
wholly central in nature". Other evidence to support this 
centralised view of motor control comes from ethological 
studies of so-called fixed actions patterns; for example, 
swallowing in vertebrates, which is known to be independent of 
peripheral control (Hinde 1970).
The general conclusion from the deafferentation studies is 
that certain skilled voluntary movement can be made 
independently of proprioceptive information which presents 
problems for the closed loop, or feedback dependent models. 
Theorists such as Adams have attempted to defend their
position, their most obvious criticism being that though
proprioception may be absent, other senses, such as vision, are 
intact and able to guide responding. Taub and Berman (1968), 
however, have shown that competent performance does occur even 
when the monkeys were deprived not only of proprioception, but 
also vision. Of course, there are still other sensory channels 
which could pass on information, although it is generally 
agreed that vision and proprioception are critical to movement 
production.
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The Problem Of Storage And Novel Movement
Even if we accept that closed loop control is possible, 
either in the absence of proprioceptive information, or with 
attenuation of such information, how can a closed loop model 
account for the production of a novel movement? In the closed 
loop system there must be an internal reference of correctness 
to which the sensory consequences of a movement can be 
compared. Therefore, if the individual produces a movement 
which achieves his goal, it is assumed he has an internal 
standard against which to compare performance, and if this is 
the case every movement will require an appropriate stored 
perceptual trace. This would seem to impose an excessive 
burden on memorial processes, especially on those engaged in 
monitoring current movement. Furthermore, it is difficult to 
see how novel movements could be made if there is no standard 
existent, against which the individual can compare performance. 
Because according to a closed loop theory a standard can only 
be established through prior experience of the movement.
The storage problem could be overcome by postulating that 
the recall of movement information is a 'constructive' process 
and moreover, of a more general nature, rather than specific 
traces for particular movements. Once the performer is given 
knowledge about the environment and the goal, he can actively 
recall the most appropriate movements within a response class 
and execute them to achieve the desired goal. Such a proposal 
would allow the individual to produce novel movements that are 
successful. Closed loop theories, however, say little about 
such a constructive memorial process.
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Response Initiation
In feedback dependent models of motor learning sensory 
information guides responding once the movement is under way, 
however, what is the trigger, or stimulus for initiating the 
response? Adams suggests that through stimulus-response 
pairings a second trace is formed which is known as the 
memory trace, and this is strengthened over trials through 
practice. The function of this memory trace is not to control 
the movement, but to initiate and select the first response. 
Adam's theory has two distinct memory states; the memory 
trace, which is dependent on motor recall, and the perceptual 
trace which is dependent on recognition to guide the 
movement.
Open Loop Models Of Kotor Learning
One feature of the open loop models of motor learning is 
that the monitoring of movement during execution is not always 
necessary. Both Lashley (1917) and Woodworth (1899), 
entertained the concept of a motor program in the form of a 
pre-structured unit, or program of a generalised nature which 
could be 'run off automatically, without reference to 
peripheral mechanisms, Since these early ideas on the 
programmed control of motor performance, the concept has been 
expanded and refined. This is in part due to the recent 
influence of artificial intelligence models used to describe 
human behaviour.
Fitts and Posner (1967), two of the early researchers, 
suggested the analogy between movement control and a computer 
system. It is clear that simple movements might be similar to
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a program within a computer, moreover, there is no reason to 
suppose that such programs, in the form of sub-units, could not 
be structured and linked in such a way as to form more complex 
programs which would be analogous to a movement sequence. 
Keel (as reported in Schmidt 1982) proposed a Gearshift
Analogy to explain how programs might be combined to produced 
a complex movement sequence. During initial learning each
action is thought to be controlled by a single program, with 
practice the first two elements combine and become controlled 
by a single program, this is followed by the combination of 
three components. So as practice continues all components will 
be combined and controlled under the auspices of a single 
program. Such motor control programs are thought to be of a 
generalised nature, to which caveats can be added, in order to 
execute a specific movement, in a particular circumstance.
These parameters might include such details as, force or speed 
of movement.
Open loop models are often looked upon with some scepticism 
as there is little evidence from human experimental studies to 
substantiate such a theory. There are data from sub-human 
species however, which support this centralist view; for 
example, locust flight (Wilson 1964) and bird song (Hottebohm 
1970). Wilson, in his studies of locust flight, demonstrated 
that removal of the wings of the locust did not affect the 
movement patterning of the exposed muscle endings. To 
decrease any other sensory information, Wilson not only 
removed the wings, but also the legs and body, thus leaving
only the head. The remaining projections, which would have 
normally carried information to the wings, still showed the
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normal flight pattern. Wilson concluded from these studies 
that there must be a central program for wing movements in the 
locust.
Problems With Open Loop Models Of Motor Control
According to the open loop theory of movement control, 
actions can be executed without reference to peripheral 
information. If this is the case, then how can the individual 
modify performance, or detect errors during execution? When 
an error does occur in performance, this may be for one of two 
reasons; first that the wrong program has been selected, or 
second, that although the correct program was chosen initially, 
some event occurs which disrupts performance. In the first
case, a new program must be selected which requires the 
engagement of higher processes. In the second, the initial 
program was correct so it can be re-run if the motor system 
itself can cope with the unexpected event. Furthermore, as 
there is no need for the selection of a new program, higher 
centres need not be involved and error correction can occur 
rapidly. The mechanism which provides a means for this rapid 
correction of errors is the gamma loop between the
contracting muscle and the spinal cord. This functions as a 
follow-up servo system which can operate without reference to 
higher processes.
Another difficulty with the pre-programmed notion of motor 
control is that movements are rarely carried out in exactly the 
same way; for example, a tennis forehand drive may never be 
performed in an identical manner. How can this be so if the
movement is under the control of a program? This again
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invokes the problem of the production of novel movements, Let 
us look at the tennis stroke. If studied in detail, no two will 
be the same, therefore every stroke is in some sense a novel 
movement. The production of each stroke will be based on what 
the individual knows about the playing of tennis, and he will 
be able to select a general program which will produce the 
type of shot he requires. With the addition of various 
parameters to the program the individual will be able to 
execute the specific movement successfully.
Whether we are considering open or close loop models of 
motor control, some form of feedback is assumed to operate. 
In the former case feedback forms the basis for a redefinition 
of goals, or re-selection of responses for the next attempt. 
In the latter case feedback via the gamma loop maybe
responsible for modifying behaviour during movement 
production. The dependence on some form of feedback in the 
two different control systems is not disputed, but rather it is 
the way in which it functions within them that is of interest.
ORGANISATIOR OF THE ÜRITS OF MOVEMERT BEHAVIOUR
In this section three principles of the organisation of 
motor units will be considered; chaining, hierarchies and 
schemas. Serial chaining is the linking together of S-R units.
The feedback consequences of one movement becomes the stimulus
for the next movement, and so on, to form a chain of S-R
connections. One difficulty with the notion of chaining comes 
from studies that have shown performance of movement 
sequences in the absence of proprioception however, once
— 13 -
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proprioception is removed, the chain is broken and the 
movement sequence becomes disrupted.
The second type of organisation is that of a heirarchy as 
proposed by Fitts and Posner (1967), and Bryan and Harter 
(1899). The notion of heirarchical control is analogous to the 
control of language processes (Chomsky 1972). This may be the 
reason why movement is often referred to as the language of 
the body. The deep structure, or goal of the movement is not 
manifest in the surface structure, or in the individual 
movements themselves. Consider the hypothetical hierarchy of 
a badminton smash (Figure One)
Vhen such a hierarchy is fully developed, it would no doubt 
provide a detailed description of how a successful smash might 
be accomplished; however, unless it is organised and ordered in 
some way it becomes merely a collection of descriptive 
statements. The idea of a hierarchy alone is not enough, as 
the critical feature is the 'ordering principle', that controls 
the sequence in which each of the operations is performed. 
The type of mechanism that might fulfil this role is often 
referred to as an executive, and is responsible for guiding 
operations and overseeing the interactions that occur between 
the operations.
The problem with the hierarchical model of motor control is 
that the distinctions between each level are not clear, and the 
information stored within each level uncertain. Possibly some 
of the most fruitful ways of testing such a model is through 
the construction of a computer analogy which could be assessed 
on a succeed or fail criterion. Testing would operate through
14 -
ths various levels within the hierarchy on the basis of a 
TOTE unit principle (Killer, Galanter and Pribrum, 1960),
The final mode of organisation that has been applied to 
motor control is the notion of a schema. Bartlett (1958) used 
the idea to explain data from his verbal recall experiments 
which was then generalised to describe motor behaviour in 
British sport, in this case cricket! Schemas are thought to be 
rules used by the individual to classify responses into larger 
units that have similar overall characteristics, thus making 
the stored information of a more general nature. Schmidt 
(1957) revived the notion of schema in motor learning and 
proposed that through past experience the individual forms 
relationships between how muscles are activated, what muscles 
do, and how such actions feel. This knowledge provides the 
individual with rules, or schemas about the way in which his 
body works.
Schema theory as proposed by Schmidt has two distinct 
processes, the first a recall schema which initiates the 
response and corrects errors. This recall schema is based on 
past experiences of the relationship between actual outcomes 
and response specifications. So the individual makes a 
movement and pairs the response specifications with the 
outcomes of that specific episode. After a number of such 
experiences a relationship is formed between these two 
variables and will be updated as new information is acquired. 
Vhen the individual is required to produce a novel movement he 
enters the schema with the outcome and the initial conditions 
specified. The schema relationships produce the response
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spevl 1 ivBTioDS for thaI- which is then executed by
running a motor program.
The second process is a recognition schema which operates 
to evaluate responses and consists of the relationship 
between initial conditions, sensory consequences and actual 
outcomes. During actual movement the individual specifies the 
outcomes of the movement and predicts, through the recognition 
schema the sensory consequences of that movement. The actual 
sensory consequences of the movement are then compared with 
the expected sensory results, any disparity between the two 
indicates that an error has occurred. It is clear that once 
the recognition schema is well established then error 
correction can be accomplished without knowledge of results. 
Furthermore, once the actual consequences of the movement are 
available the recall schema can be updated.
The schema in such a model would be powerful enough to 
modify, or change the goal of the movement should the 
individual find that his movement is affected by external 
perturbations that cannot be handled by peripheral feedback; 
for example a gust of wind, just as the golfer is about to play 
a stroke. In this case the program has already been initiated 
and is therefore uninfluenced by peripheral feedback; 
however, the motor schema will allow the golfer to modify his 
goal so correct execution of the movement will occur.
The fundamental principle of schema theory is the motor 
program. Schemas operate in the context of the motor program 
which has parameters that determine a specific movement 
instance, Schmidt proposed that schemas are internal 
representations of the individual's past movement experience in
- 16 -
the form of multi-mode information which is organised through 
sensory integration. Schemas then are rules for learning, 
the claim is that under this system slow movements are 
feedback based, and rapid movements are program based. With 
experience the individual develops rules for movement and is 
then able to generate novel actions based on his past 
experience with these rules.
Motor Control And The Type Of Skill
The extent to which feedback is important may vary from 
one skill to another, with the skill itself determining, or at 
least influencing, the type of system that controls the 
movements. It is within this context that we shall consider 
the main divisions of skills, i.e. open and closed. An open 
skill is one performed in a changing environment and will 
therefore demand flexibility of execution. It would be 
reasonable to suppose that open skills are more likely to be 
feedback dependent, in order to cope with such changes.
The second skill category is a closed skill, where the 
emphasis is on correct repetition of a set movement pattern. 
By contrast to the open skill situation the environment of a 
closed skill remains relatively stable, and it may be that 
movements are more likely to be pre-programmed. The final 
factor is the extent to which skills are innate, or learned. 
Summers and Keele <1976) have suggested that movements with a 
large innate component are likely to be pre-programmed, 
whereas feedback monitoring will play a greater role in those 
skills that must be learned, for example manipulative skills.
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The controversy within the literature about the various 
systems of motor control may, in part, be due to the nature 
of the skills that were tested. In Adams' case the information 
on which his theory is based comes largely from experimental 
data on a di^^eet and closed skill, in this case a linear 
positioning task. The problems with Adams' theory and others 
like it are only revealed when other variables are introduced, 
or when the theory is generalised to skills of a different 
type.
Two theoretical approaches to motor control have been 
considered, and it seems that both the feedback dependent 
system and the pre-programmed system must, of necessity co­
exist, in order to account for the complexity of human motor 
behaviour. Due to the variety of skills, some which have an 
innate component, and others which do not, together with the 
fact that different skills make dissimilar demands on the 
information processing system, implies that our approach to 
motor learning should be eclectic. The proposal is that both 
open and closed loop models of motor control are essential, in 
order to provide a satisfactory theoretical account of motor 
learning.
K O T O R  C O R T R O L  AÏTD T H E  A I K S  O F  T HE P R E S E R T  S T U D I E S  
The emphasis in the present programme of study is to 
examine the organisation of the units of motor behaviour, more 
specifically, these studies will focus on the ordering of motor 
events within a sequence, as this appears to be a critical 
feature in skill acquisition. The organising of movements 
implies some form of cognitive process at work, whereby
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responses can be manipulated into meaningful movement 
sequences. If, by specific practice of the sequential 
component of a task, or skill it is possible to facilitate 
acquisition and furthermore, improve performance, then this 
would have implications as to how the units of motor behaviour 
are organised. The types of cognitive processes which might 
accompany such specific practice would greatly add to our 
understanding of the principles of organisation which are 
fundamental to motor learning.
Traditionally skills are thought of as primarily motor in 
nature, more recently, however, the emphasis has changed in 
that the cognitive aspects of skill learning are thought to 
play a vital role in the organisation and control of movement. 
If mental practice is 'imagined' movement, without actual 
movement, then such practice may be the mental manipulation of 
the sequential elements that are responsible for structuring 
the movements. Alternatively, mental practice could be the 
mediational process for specifying the various parameters of a
planned movement sequence.
Thus this study is an attempt to show that mental practice 
works by facilitating and organising the cognitive component 
of a task which guides operations during execution of a 
movement sequence. The second proposal is that mental 
practice may be the process by which individuals prepare a 
program prior to movement execution. Whether these two 
proposals are separable is at present somewhat in doubt. It 
is clear, however, that facilitation of the sequential 
component, and subsequent enhanced levels of performance, 
following mental practice can be tested experimentally.
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Finally, by manipulating this component of the skill and by 
examining individual differences on a differential basis it is 
hoped to reveal the nature of the cognitive processes that may 
accompnay the mental practice phenomena.
8UKKAEY
In this introduction the various approaches to motor 
control and the acquisition of skill have been discussed, and 
in addition some analysis of the methods by which motor 
information is organised were considered. The theoretical 
discussion revealed the necessity to review the nature of 
skills themselves as this factor may be crucial in determining 
their method of control. Three types of organisation were 
considered; chaining, hierarchies and schemas. The common 
principle that emerged was that all these principles function 
by imposing order on the events, or movements to be 
performed, and it is this issue which is the concern of the 
present investigations.
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Introduction
Mental practice is the 'imagining of a motor skill without
the occurrence of any overt movement^g During the last forty /
years many investigators have examined the phenomenon of 
mental practice, which is sometimes referred to as mental 
rehearsal, covert practice, or internalised rehearsal. Overall, 
however, the area reflects a confusing array of evidence, 
together with a lack of any common theoretical approach. The 
emphasis of the majority of these studies has been on the 
facilitatory effects of mental rehearsal on motor skills during 
acquisition, as reflected in improvements of performance. 
This emphasis is in part due to the fact that mental practice 
is seen to have advantages as a training method in sport and 
physical education (Whitehead, 1974. Suinn, 1970).
More recently, investigators have begun to see the value 
of mental practice as a research tool (Summers, 1977), in that 
it may provide insights into motor control processes. This 
change of direction is associated with a similar change of 
emphasis in theories of motor control and the acquisition of 
skills. Rather than seeing movement behaviour simply in terms 
of motor responses, the contemporary view is that such 
behaviour may be interpreted as a composition of cognitive 
processes which intervene between stimulus presentation and 
response generation. Before we embark on an evaluation of the 
various explanations of mental rehearsal it will be necessary
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/
to consider in general terms the methodology and constraints 
on the effectiveness of mental practice.
The Mental Practice Paradigm
The usual procedure for studying mental practice involves 
at least three groups of subjects, a physical practice group, a 
mental practice group and a control, or no-practice group. 
Subjects are typically rated for baseline levels of performance 
before the different treatments begin. In general the physical 
practice group continues actual performance of the task, with 
the mental practice group engaging in some form of imaginary 
practice, while the control group, either do nothing or 
perform a distractor task to prevent rehearsal of the skill. 
In this way the effects of mental practice on subsequent 
performance is assessed and compared to the other methods of 
treatment.
Rawlings, Chen and Yilk (1972) using the pursuit rotor task 
demonstrated the mental practice effect. Three groups; 
physical practice, mental practice and no-practice received 25 
trials on day one of the study, and on days 2  to 9  subjects 
engaged in their various practice methods, depending on the 
groups to which they were assigned. Practice, both physical 
and mental was 25 trials per day. All subjects were tested on 
day 10, by performing a further 25 trials. Results showed 
that the mental practice group did learn over the treatment 
period, almost to the extent of the physical practice group. 
By contrast, the controls improved hardly at all.
It is difficult to assess the rate of learning of the mental 
practice group as data points are only available for day one
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and day 1 0  of the study, whereas for the physical practice 
group data points are available for every day of practice. 
Nevertheless, overall mental practice is shown to be an 
effective way of facilitating acquisition on the pursuit rotor.
These results are somewhat surprising in view of comments 
made by Smyth (1975), and others who have reported little or 
no effect of mental practice on this task. . Furthermore, many 
subjects report difficulties in imagining the pursuit rotor 
task. Smyth says, "subjects should perhaps be taught to 
practice mentally before being used in experiments of this 
sort",/ (pursuit rotor). This fact may account for the 
ineffectiveness of mental practice on the pursuit rotor task.
It has also been revealed that massed mental practice trials 
are difficult to engage in, (Corbine 1972), as concentration 
is difficult to maintain, so all— irn— aid the Rawlings et al y'
results should be view with a little scepticism.
What is happening in the mental practice situation? 
Intuitively, we might suppose that individuals must experience 
continued practice of a task in order to improve their 
performance. Mental practice, however, can positively effect 
execution of some skills: Twining, 1949; Jones, 1963; Stebbins,
1968; Rawling Chen and Yilk, 1972, relative to a no-practice 
control group. Other studies have demonstrated that prior 
experience of the task is not essential for subjects to 
benefit from mental practice, (Oxendine 1969). It has been 
suggested that during mental practice the novice can think 
about possible courses of actions, and can test these out, 
prior to actual movement. Due to previous experience 
individuals can predict the possible outcomes of their actions
- 23
and disregard inappropriate responses. Such an interpretation 
of mental practice is closely linked to the notion of schema 
theory.
The study cited above represents a typical example of the 
type of experiments used to substantiate claims for the 
effectiveness of mental practice. How do we know that what 
the subject is doing during mental practice has the effect 
attributed to it? Powell (1973), tested two groups of female 
subjects on a dart throw skill. The first group was a 
positive mental practice group, who imagined hitting the bull 
and the second, / negative mental practice group who imagined A, /
either aiming to the high righthand side, or performing an 
overlong throw. Those subjects who positively practiced 
showed a significant (28%) gain over initial performance, 
whereas the group who negatively practiced showed a 
deterioration of 3%. Powell suggests that negative rehearsal 
disrupts the plan necessary to throw accurately by providing 
false feedback to the subject. These results suggest that 
whatever the subject is doing during mental practice can 
affect execution. Furthermore, performance can improve or 
worsen as a result of the type of mental practice engaged in.
I shall now consider some of the theoretical interpretations 
that have been proposed, over the last decade, to explain the 
mental practice effect. Examination of these will hopefully 
lead to the formulation of more concrete proposals, and the 
formulation of a testable hypothesis.
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EXPLAaATlORS OF HEBTAL PRACTICE
The Neuromuscular Hypothesis of Mental Practice
The electrophysiology of mental practice was pioneered by 
Jacobson in 1932. He attempted to find a quantitative 
relationship between muscular activity and mental events. 
Jacobson claimed he was able to measure action potentials in 
the muscles of small amplitudes. Sensitivity, however, was a 
problem using these early recording methods, so Jacobson’s 
subjects were trained in a relaxation technique prior to
participation in his experiments to keep baseline levels of
muscular activity low. Any changes in activity therefore
could be more readily detected.
Jacobson instructed his subjects to imagine various 
everyday activities, such as, putting a cigarette to one's
mouth, or throwing a ball. He controlled for activity in those 
muscles not engaged in the task by recording from an inactive 
limb. Jacobson studied both imagined movement, and 
remembered movement. His results showed that levels of 
muscular activity were greater, and of longer duration, during 
imagined movement than for recollected movement. Recordings 
were also taken from the eye muscles during imagined movement, 
and these data revealed that activity of the ocular muscles 
accompanied imagined movement. Jacobson suggested this was 
due to the visualisation of the activity. He further proposed 
a distinction between imagined movement and remembered 
movement; in the first case the subject feels the sensations 
associated with the action, whereas in the second case the 
subject apparently views the activity as a spectator. Jacobson 
compared these two types of activity and found that when asked
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to imagine forearm flexion, this was accompanied by an 
increase of activity in the eye muscles, but not in the 
performing limb, whereas others showed activity in the limb 
but not in the eyes. He concluded that this was due to the 
fact that some subjects made a greater use of imagery than 
others.
Eight years later, using more sophisticated equipment, Shaw 
(1940) studied imagined weight lifting. The weights lifted
ranged from 100 gm to 500 gm, in increments of 100 gm, with a
control weight of 200 gm. The subject was first instructed to 
actually lift the weight and then relax for five minutes; 
following this he imagined lifting the weight. This procedure 
was repeated for all weights in a random order. At the end of 
testing the subject was asked to rate imagery during mental 
practice on a four point scale; vague, fair, clear or vivid.
The data revealed that imagery was most vivid when concurrent 
muscular activity increased, that is with the heaviest weights.
Shaw's result must be viewed with caution as his data is
based on one subject only, and furthermore the imagery
/I rratings were purely subjective, however, they do followf^g V
*
closely the comments made by Jacobson. These two investigators 
are agreed that the more vivid the imagery, the greater the
activity of the muscles involved in the task being imagined.
Other studies have also attempted to record muscular activity 
during mental practice; (Ulich, 1967; Schick, 1970). There are 
problems with studies such as these in that it is not clear
whether vividness of imagery is a result of the activity
imagined, or imagery is the precursor to that activity.
Therefore, mealietric interpretation of this data is difficult. /
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To summarise this section on the physiology of mental 
practice some tentative conclusions may be drawn. When 
surface electrodes are placed on large muscle groups of 
subjects engaged in mental practice, they detect muscular 
activity above normal baseline levels. There is evidence to 
suggest that such activity is restricted to those muscles 
which are involved in the task. Furthermore, it appears that 
any increase in muscle action potential is usually associated 
with imagining self-participât ion, rather than merely 
recollecting the task. Studies of implicit speech do provide 
some support for the neuromuscular explanation of mental 
practice. When subjects engage in implicit speech EMG activity 
reveals patterns, from the vocal musculature, that are similar 
to those produced when actually speaking, Schmidt (1982). If 
this is so then the mental performance of movement could also 
involve these same low level muscular forces.
Motor Programs And Mental Practice
A more recent explanation of mental practice proposes that 
such practice involves the initiation of the motor programs 
associated with the task to be executed. The idea is that the 
performer can run off the appropriate programs prior to 
execution. Two possible explanations can be put forward as to 
why such activity may benefit future performance. The first is 
that by running off the sub-programs involved in a movement 
sequence prior to action, the individual can begin to combine 
these units into a higher-order program. According to the 
Gearshift Theory discussed earlier, this is thought to be one 
method by which overt practice operates in order to refine the
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task to be learned. Moreover, there is no reason to suppose 
that such processes, which accompany physical practice, should 
not be involved in mental practice, and thus achieve the same 
result.
The second proposal involves the neuromuscular aspects of 
mental practice. The suggestion is that the running of the 
programs associated with the skill produces low level 
innervation in the muscles involved in that action. As a 
result of this activity, the performer is able to evaluate the 
feedback produced which is a consequence of this low level 
muscular activity. Within the context of mental practice, such 
feedback could serve as a means by which the parameters of a 
generalised program can be defined. Parameters define the 
operating characteristics of the program which specify the 
particular expression of that movement sequence. For example, 
if the performer is required to speed up a movement sequence, 
he may during mental practice select various parameters so as 
to assess their possible success or failure in completing the 
sequence within a given time limit. Thus the performer may 
well be able to choose the most appropriate speed parameter 
prior to the execution of the sequence. Such a process could 
also apply to other parameters, such as muscle selection and 
force.
There is one difficult with this particular idea; as no 
movement actually occours, the feedback produced as a result of 
this low level innervation of the muscles may not be in terms 
of classic prprioceptive information. There are, however, 
other forms of internal feedback which can be relayed to the 
highest centres within the CBS (Schmidt 1982). Nevertheless,
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the feedback which is the result of mental practice could 
operate as a means by which the parameters associated with a 
program for future action can be defined.
The Symbolic Learning Hypothesis
The symbolic learning hypothesis states that mental 
practice allows the subject to organise and learn the 
structure, or organisation of the constituent movements of the 
task. Korrisett (1967) argued that mental rehearsal will 
facilitate learning, only to the extent that symbolic factors 
are involved in the task. He further suggests that tasks that 
are purely motor in nature would benefit little from mental 
practice. As we have already said Morrisett attempted to 
resolve the question of which tasks will benefit by analysing 
the types of skills under test. Furthermore, Morrisett 
examined the manipulation of this symbolic component, 
within the same task. The task was card sorting and the 
symbolic component was varied by changing the rule associated 
with particular types of cards, and the slot into which they 
had to be placed. Subjects were assigned to either a mental 
practice or no-practice group in a high or low symbolic 
condition. The results revealed that in the low symbolic 
condition there was no difference between the groups, whereas 
in the high symbolic condition the mental practice group was 
superior to the no-practice group.
Smyth (1975) also examined skill difference, using two 
tasks which reflected emphasis on either the symbolic or 
motor component of the skill; mirror drawing (symbolic) and 
pursuit rotor (motor). Using a mental practice group, a
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physical practice group, a control and various yoked cuntrols, 
she demonstrated that during the mirror drawing task there 
was some improvement in the mental practice group during 
initial learning, On the pursuit rotor task however, the 
physical practice group showed consistent superiority. The 
subjects in the mental practice group reported great difficulty 
in imagining the pursuit rotor during mental practice.
Smyth suggested that because the pursuit rotor is externally 
paced this places constraints on the subject whilst trying to
imagine the task. This may be one of the reasons for the
failure of mental practice to influence performance on some 
tasks. Furthermore, as mental rehearsal is an unfamiliar type 
of practice, for the majority of individuals it may be difficult 
for them to engage in such practice (Ergstrom, 1964)
Fitts and Posner (1967) proposed that the early stages of 
learning were more cognitive than the later ones, therefore we 
may expect mental practice to be more influential during
initial learning, when the individual is attempting to form a 
'gross framework* of the skill. Jones study of the hock swing 
upstart demonstrated that learning of a novel task can occur 
without demonstration or physical practice of the task. This 
may be because subjects, as Jones says, form a powerful 
kinesthetic image of the task which enables them to form 
their own strategies to execute the task. Jones <1963) and 
Summers (1977) have suggested that this symbolic component, or 
kinesthetic image of the task^is sequential in nature.
It has been suggested that mental practice may only be 
effective in that it enhances learning about the cognitive 
aspects of the task, such as the sequence in which the
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movements must be performed, and that little effect would be 
seen on the motor elements of the task. The studies 
considered so far, however, allow for no direct test of this 
idea as they do not differentiate, or provide independent 
measures of the sequential component, and of the motor acts 
themselves.
Dickinson (1978) attempted to provide such independent 
measures by employing a ball throwing task where subjects 
were required to throw balls into a correct bin. In order to 
do this subjects had to learn the sequence of correct bins. 
On each 10 second period within a trial only one of the bins 
was designated as correct, the sequence of correct bins within 
a trial was fixed from trial to trial. The termination of each 
1 0  second period was marked by an auditory stimulus and a 
brief flash of light mounted on the bin which was correct 
during the prior 10 second period. Thus the subject had to 
learn both the correct sequence of bins, and to throw the balls 
accurately into the bins. Furthermore, these two aspects of 
the task could be measured independently. (See Figure Two)
All subjects received two pre-treatment trials before being 
assigned to one of four groups; physical practice (P) where 
subjects experienced the same procedure as in the pre­
treatment phase, no-practice (SP), or no exposure to the task, 
mental practice (MP) and mental practice with feedback (MPF). 
During treatment the mental practice groups stood at the 
throwing position and imagined performing the task. The first 
mental practice group (MP) received no feedback information 
about the correct sequence, whereas the second group (KPF) 
received the light flash on the correct bins. Following
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treatment stage all groups received two test trials using the 
pre-treatment procedure.
If mental practice is effective then Groups MPF and MP
should show superior performance relative to Group MP, 
Furthermore, if mental practice only affects learning about the 
sequence aspect of the task any enhancement in performance 
should arise from an increase in the number of correct bins
aimed at, rather than greater accuracy and speed of ball 
throwing per se. In addition we might expect to observe a
greater improvement in performance by Group MPF which received 
feedback information about the sequence. These predictions 
were borne out by the data. Figure Three shows the
performance of the groups in terms of the number of balls in 
the correct bins, relative to the total number of balls thrown. 
The performance of Group MPF was superior to all other groups,
A further analysis revealed that none of the groups differed in 
terms of the accuracy, or speed of ball throwing. Rather the 
superiority of Group MPF seems to have arisen from the fact 
that during test they threw at fewer incorrect bins, (See 
Figure Four)
Dickinson's results also showed that Group MPF was superior 
to Group PP although this group received as much information 
about the task during the treatment trials. Overall the MPF 
Group were superior to the MP and PP Groups, and the results 
showed that feedback about the sequence is essential to their 
improvement (Group MP alone were worse than Group MP), It 
must be pointed out that Group MPF did receive a greater 
number of informative trials than Groups NP and MP, The 
overall significance of this finding indicates that mental
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practice allows the subject time to plan his strategy, learn 
the sequence and rule out incorrect responses.
Subjects in Group MPF had the opportunity to rehearse the 
sequence component without monitoring their motor responses 
which gave them some advantage over the physical practice 
group. This raises the question of the nature of this 
advantage. Two possible interpretations to this problem are 
apparent. First, subjects engaged in physical practice are 
required to divide their attention between learning the 
sequence and performing the motor acts themselves. This 
results in a disruption of both sequence learning and execution 
of the movements. By constrast, subjects engaged in mental 
practice learn the sequence prior to attempting the task. 
With this accomplished they were in a position to execute the 
task with accuracy.
The second possible interpretation is that the underlying 
motor control systems operate differently in the two groups. 
Initially, physical practice demands that subjects switch 
between different states of control, to both learn the sequence 
and execute the movements. By contrast, mental practice 
subjects would not be required to switch between these 
different states, and would be ready for action on the first 
trial of acquisition. Both these interpretations are 
speculative, but begin to provide pointers as to why mental 
practice facilitates performance on this task,
VARIABLES KARIPÜLATED IR MENTAL PRACTICE STUDIES 
Time Of Mental Practice
One of the variables manipulated in the mental practice 
situation is the time allowed for such practice. The data
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reveals a diversity of results on this dimension. The range of 
times employed vary from one minute, (Schick,1970) to 50 
minutes (Vandell, Clugston and Davis, 1945). Twining (1949) 
considered this variable in some detail. He examined a ring 
toss task using 36 male subjects, assigned to one of three 
groups. Subjects in a control group, threw 210 rings on the 
first and twenty-second days of the experiment. The second 
group, the physical practice group, threw 2 1 0  rings on the 
first day, and from then on, to the twenty-first day threw 70 
rings each day. The final group, the mental practice group 
also threw 2 1 0  rings on the first day, but from then to the 
twenty-first day rehearsed mentally for fifteen minutes daily 
from the second to the twenty-first day. Twining attempted to 
keep motivation high by making the subjects note their own 
scores. The instructions given to the mental practice group 
was to visualise all the 'sensations' associated with the task.
Analysis was in terms of difference scores of performance 
on the first and twenty-second days of the experiment. 
Results showed that both physical practice and mental 
practice groups were significantly better than the no-practice 
control group. In the mental practice group, rehearsal lasted 
for fifteen minutes, whilst in the physical practice group the 
time taken to toss 70 rings averaged 7% minutes, which is 
half the time devoted to mental practice. Furthermore, 
subjects in the mental practice group found it difficult to 
carry out such practice for fifteen minutes, and from 
subjective data collected it appeared that the optimal period 
for mental practice was five minutes only. Despite these 
difficulties, the experiment demonstrated that mental practice
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can be as effective as physical practice. As a result of 
these data most studies use no more than five minutes mental 
practice, and when a greater length of time is desired then 
rest periods are inserted between mental practice periods. The 
fact that distributed mental practice appears to be more 
effective than unspaced practice is supported by Corbin (1972).
Mental Practice And Type Of Skill
Some investigators have indicated that mental practice may 
only benefit the acquisition of certain types of skills. As we 
have seen perceputal-motor skills can be analysed into two 
components, (Dickinson 1978). The first, a cognitive, or 
sequential element, and the second, the motor acts themselves. 
Morrisett (described by Richardson 1967) rated various skills 
in terms of whether they were high or low in symbolic content 
and motor element. If, as suggested by Morrisett, it is the 
symbolic component of the skill, rather than its motor 
components that determine whether mental practice will benefit 
subsequent performance, then an analysis of the skill itself 
will be essential to any study of mental practice.
Morrisett had judges independently rate two tasks, the 
finger dexterity task, which was considered to be high on the 
motor element and low on the symbolic component, and by 
contrast a two handed coordination task which was rated as the 
reverse. Mental practice studies were conducted using both 
these tasks and revealed that its effects were greater on the 
task with the high symbolic component. This evidence supports 
Morrisett's hypothesis that mental practice generally improves 
performance where the symbolic content of the skill to be
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acquired is high. The question is what does liorrisett mean by 
'symbolic' component? Furthermore, how is he defining 'high', 
is he referring to the amount of central processing that might 
be involved in the task? I assume that Morriset and I are in 
agreement on this point, in that the symbolic aspects of a 
motor skill refer to the organisation and structuring of the 
movements, rather than execution of the motor acts.
Mental Practice And Task Difficulty
Task difficulty is another variable which has captured the 
attention of researchers in this area. If Morrisett is to be 
believed however, then difficulty would make little difference 
to the overall benefits of mental rehearsal as it is the nature 
of the task itself which determines any improvement in 
performance, Phipps and Morehouse (1969), on the other hand, 
have argued that the difficulty of the task may indeed 
determine the relative effect of mental practice. They studied 
three tasks, the hock swing upstart, the jump foot and the 
soccer hitch kick. From a previous pilot study of a random 
population of male university students, it was shown that the 
three tasks differed systematically in difficulty, in terms of 
the percentage of subjects who could successfully perform them. 
Each performance of the task was assessed on a pass or fail 
criterion over ten attempts. The subjects, seventy-two males 
were assigned to either a control, or mental practice group. 
The tasks were novel to all participants. The control group 
was given demonstrations of the task and the criterion for a 
successful attempt was described. The same procedure was used 
for all three tasks. The experimental group met and engaged
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in mental practice. The mental practice group were shown a 
demonstration of the task during this practice period. The 
subjects were then instructed to close their eyes and imagine 
themselves performing the skill as a description of it was 
read to them.
Following three days treatment all subjects were tested, 
Phipps and Morehouse found that the only significant difference 
between the mental practice and the controls was on the hock 
swing upstart, the easiest task, Mo different was found 
between the groups on the other two skills. These data 
support Jones (1963) findings who also used the hock swing 
upstart, but did not include a no-practice control group.
The data from Phipps and Morehouse's experiment is 
difficult to interpret as they have ignored the possible effect 
of directive mental practice which would limit the subject's 
ability to develop his own strategies that might accomplish 
the task. Furthermore, whilst demonstration avoids confusing 
mental practice with physical practice it is thought to 
significantly alter levels of motivation, particularly in the 
case of male subjects. Both these factors may have played a 
part in biasing the subjects in favour of the simpler skill.
Schedules of Mental And Physical Practice
One of the problems in considering the type of skill as a 
variable is the possibility that subjects have had some prior 
experience of the task (Steel, 1952; Shick, 1970; Vhitley, 
1962; Ammons, 1951), As a consequence, many experiments have 
used various schedules of mental practice, preceded by 
different amounts of physical practice, in order to determine
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whether the physical practice accelerates acquisition to a 
greater extent than mental practice alone. Oxendine (1969) 
examined three tasks, the basket ball jump shot, the soccer 
kick and the pursuit rotor. These tasks were tested under 
different schedules of mental and physical practice. Subjects 
were assigned to one of four groups, a physical practice group, 
or one of three other groups in which the amount of physical 
practice was systematically reduced from 8  to 2  trials with 
the remaining trials administered under the mental practice 
condition. The treatment lasted for a total of seven days.
On the pursuit rotor task, analysis of the first day scores 
revealed no significant difference between . those subjects who 
kad received 8  physical practice trials anc those who received 
6  physical practice trials together with 2  mental practice 
trials. The performance of these two groups^ however, was 
superior to all other groups. For the soccer kick task no 
significant difference was found on the pre-test scores or on 
the test which occurred on day 8 , although all groups showed 
improved performance. The final task, the basketball jump shot, 
again showed no significant difference on test, with all groups 
showing little improvement,
Oxendine concluded from these results that^if the skill is ^
within the capacity of the learner, up to half of the trials 
given can be mental practice trials, rather than physical 
practice. This statement, however, is based on mean values in 
the data tables, and not on differences supported by
statistical analysis.
Many researchers feel that some physical experience of 
the task is essential if any benefits are to be felt following
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mental practice, although there are exceptions to this view. 
Jones (1963) tested 71 subjects on a simple gymnastic skill 
(hock swing upstart) 0  Two groups were used, one a directed 
mental practice group, the other a non-directed mental practice 
group. The information given was a mechanical description of 
the task. On a pass or fail criterion 56% of subjects passed 
the test at their first attempt, demonstrating that learning 
can occur without physical practice. Jones went on to assess 
whether the directed or non-directed variable had any influence 
on the learning of the task. He found that the non-directed 
mental practice group were superior to the directed group. 
Jones argued that undirected practice leads to the formation of 
a better 'kinesthetic image', and that the individual is able to 
generate a response with an integrated action plan already at 
his disposal.
Subjective Organisation And Mental Practice
From Jones' study it would appear that non-directed mental 
practice is most beneficial, it might be argued that such 
practice allows the individual to test out his own strategies 
which will enable him to perform the task. This idea is 
similar to that proposed by Tulving (1962), who suggested 
that during verbal learning, if subjects are allowed to 
structure and organise incoming information idiosyncratically^ 
they show improve^recall and performance on test, relative to a 
condition in which organisation is imposed on the information 
prior to processing by the subject. This notion is supported 
in the mental practice literature by Bole (1976),
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Mental Practice And Knowledge Of Results
It is generally assumed that the learning of a task, or 
skill, only occurs when knowledge of results, or knowledge of 
performance is available (Bildeau, 1969; Adams 1971). These 
types of feedback provide different types of information. 
Knowledge of results provides information about goals or 
outcomes, whereas knowledge of performance provides data about 
the movements themselves. The difficulty for mental rehearsal 
is that if no actual movement is made then how can KR and KP 
occur, and if they do not, how can the subject learn from
mental practice?
Mewell (1974) demonstrated that learning without knowledge 
of results is possible and error reduction can occur in a rapid 
linear timing task, but that it is dependent upon a recognition 
mechanism and the possible use of feedback during response 
production. Villiams and Rodney (1978) provided support for 
learning without KR, they call upon the notion of a recognition 
schema in order to interpret their results. Using a linear 
position task, subjects were divided into two groups, the 
first group moved to a target position on the slide bar, 
whereas the second group moved to a series of randomly ordered 
stops around the target. These subjects were informed that the 
location of the target was in the centre of this random 
series. Further trials followed with the subject attempting 
to move to the target. Both groups did equally well on the 
first no-KR trial but as trials progressed, subjects who had 
experienced the random sequence maintained their level of 
performance, whereas the others did not. These results can be 
explained if we call upon schema theory, in that by using a
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récognition schema subjects can generate the expectee sensory 
consequence of being at the correct location without prior 
experience of it. The subject is therefore able to match 
actual and expected sensory feedback to position the lever 
correctly.
According to schema theory (Schmidt 1975) novel movements 
can be generated given that the subjects possess ' two types of 
information, first the initial conditions, and second the 
desired outcome of the movement. Once the subject has this 
information they can determine the response specifications 
necessary to achieve the goal (Recall). The second part of 
this mechanism is the relationship between sensory 
consequences and actual outcomes as modified by initial 
conditions (Recognition). Given these two relationships
there is no reason to suppose that subjects cannot perform 
movements they have never experienced. The idea of a motor 
schema provides a theoretical basis for the production of 
novel movements in the absence of knowledge of results.
In this context mental practice could operate either within 
the recall or recognition schema, that is it could serve to 
facilitate relationships between initial conditions and 
outcomes which would allow the individual to generate the 
response specifications in order to achieve the goal. During 
mental practice the individual has the opportunity to try out 
possible strategies, the consequences of which could be 
predicted on the basis of past movement experience. Such 
activity would allow the subject to rule out many possible 
responses and limit his movements to those that are most 
appropriate.
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8UKKARY
In this section I have reviewed three theories of how 
mental practice might work; the neuromuscular hypothesis, the 
motor program theory and the symbolic learning supposition.
Although there is little doubt that covert motor activity can 
occur during mental practice, there is little evidence that 
such activity is causally related to subsequent performance.
The motor program theory put forward the notion that mental 
practice consists of 'running off a program in an attenuated 
form. This may indeed facilitate learning of the sequential 
component of the task. Another possibility is that by running 
the program prior to performance it in some way prepares the 
participant for execution of the movements, for example it may 
pre-set levels of arousal. The symbolic learning hypothesis 
does receive support from a variety of sources. Dickinson 
demonstrated that the main effect of mental practice was on 
the sequential component of a complex skill. It might be 
argued that this result is constrained by the artificial 
structure of the task employed, in order to allow for separate 
measures of the sequential and motor aspects of the task.
This introductory overview of mental practice has also 
introduced the reader to some of the methodological and 
theoretical issues involved in such practice. The discussion 
so far has revealed that, for some skills Rental practice does j ^
produce changes in performance which can either be positive or 
negative depending on what the subject rehearses. The
question of whether mental practice improves performance 
without access to knowledge of results is still controversial.
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Theoretically, at least, it is possible that certain skills can 
be learned without physical practice.
Dickinson (1978) has provided support for the idea that 
mental practice does affect the learning of the sequential 
component of a gross motor skill. The experiments reported in 
this thesis expand on this proposal and the purpose of the 
investigations will be to study the effect of mental practice 
on a complex skill. This task will allow for separate measures 
of the sequential and motor components of the task to be ^
assessed andjfurthermore, may give us some pointers as to how  ^^
they interact to determine overall performance.
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Ky previous study (Dickinson, 1978) showed that mental 
practice could facilitate learning about the sequential 
component of a gross motor skill; the significance of this 
finding was limited, however, by the fact that the task was not 
of an interactive nature. The definition of such a task is 
that performance of each movement must take into account the 
preceding, and following movements; for example, walking. In 
order to extend the analysis of mental practice, a task was 
needed which reflected the interactive nature of gross motor 
skills and so the aim of the first experiment was to develop a 
task which was interactive in character, whilst retaining the 
ability to measure the extent to which the subject learned 
about the sequential component of the task.
E X J P E K X l V E E r i s r T  0 3 S T E :
In 1932, G.B. Johnson designed a test to determine native 
differences in physical skills. The test was intended to 
overcome the specificity of existing tests, which Johnson 
considered dealt only with particular skills, and not general 
motor ability. The task was unusual enough to avoid the 
possibility that subjects may have had experience of it, and 
furthermore, it required no special speed or endurance 
abilities but only those that might be required in normal 
locomotion. The test consisted of various movements made
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FIGURE 5, Two exaKo l e s  of J o h n s o n ' s  t a s k ,
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along a matrix of squares. These movements included
straddle jumps and jumps with turn. (See Figure Five)
It was decided to adopt Johnson's task to study the effects 
of mental practice on learning. The task consisted of learning 
to perform a pre-determined sequence of hop-scotch like steps 
along a matrix of squares, as fluently and rapidly as possible. 
Before embarking on a major study of mental practice with this 
task however, it was necessary to show that it produced 
acquisition functions, characteristic of learning a gross motor 
skill.
At the start of the experiment subjects were shown a 
diagram illustrating the squares on which they should step, 
and those they should avoid. They were then allowed to 
perform one trial; if they made an error, either of commission 
by stepping on an incorrect square or of omission by failing 
to step on a correct square, they were allowed to inspect the 
diagram again. The subjects performance on each trial was 
measured in terms of the number of errors made on that trial, 
and the speed and fluency of each traverse of the runway. 
The number of errors would indicate the rate of sequence 
learning, and I expected to observe a progressive decrease in 
errors across trials. Furthermore, the error pattern was also 
subjected to a serial position analysis, so that if acquisition 
of the sequence information followed the conventional
pattern, we should expect to observe an inverted U-shaped 
serial position curve. The performance of all subjects was 
recorded on a video to allow for analysis of the fluency of 
execution. As I had no prior indication of the rate of 
learning for this task, two levels of difficulty were used, task
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easy (TE) and task difficult (TD), In the TE condition 
subjects had to learn to perform a regular pattern of foot 
movements, whereas in the TD condition an irregular pattern 
was employed.
In the introduction to this thesis it was proposed that 
mental practice will facilitate learning to the extent that it 
operates on the organisation and structuring of the symbolic 
elements of a task. Such processes are thought to function at 
a high level within the motor system where the sequence 
component is represented, and is not thought to be directly 
involved with the motor acts themselves. Evidence from 
Summers (1977) suggests that learning through mental practice 
will only occur to the extent that sequential factors are 
involved in the task. He cites the Suzuki violin method as an 
example of the establishment of sequences in memory prior to 
performance. The idea is that children taught by this method 
can store a 'musical template' of the sequences of movements 
which will enhance later performance. This allows them to 
recognise errors in sound production and the sequence of 
movements that lead to that sound.
If mental practice works by structuring the sequence 
component and facilitates its storage, rather than directly 
influencing the motor acts themselves, then such practice 
should only be effective if performance is sensitive to 
factors relating to the access and processing of this type of 
symbolic information.
In order to decide whether learning could be modulated by 
access to symbolic information, in the form of knowledge about 
sequence the subjects in the easy and difficult conditions
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FIGURE 6, Sequence for Task Easy and Task Difficult.
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were allowed either a short or long period to inspect the 
diagram which specified the correct sequence. Thus the 
experiment had a 2 x 2 factorial design with the difficulty of 
the sequence as one factor and inspection time as the other.
M E T H O D
Subjects
Twenty subjects, all female aged between 19 and 21 years, 
were assigned to one of four groups: TE/30, TE/120, TD/30, TD/ 
120.
Apparatus
The runway used in this study was a matrix of squares 15 
X 2 made up of standard commercial floor tiles (23cm x 23 cm) 
glued to a large plastic sheet. The sequence consisted of one
foot to one foot movements, one foot to two feet, and two feet
to one foot movements. The sequences for this task are 
illustrated in Figure Six.
Procedure
The first variable was the two levels of difficulty with the 
second being the time the subject had to inspect the 
instruction sheet, either 30 seconds or 120 seconds. The 
subject first inspected the sequence instructions for the 
appropriate time depending upon the group to which they had
been assigned. The subject then attempted to reproduce the
foot pattern on the runway. If they made one or more errors, 
they received a further inspection period for the appropriate 
time before the next trial. This procedure was continued for
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six trials, and every trial was recorded on a Sony Videocorder 
for later analysis.
Measures Of Performance
Sequence learning was indexed by the number of errors made 
on each trial, and speed was measured as the time taken to 
complete one traverse of the runway. The final measure was a 
qualitative evaluation of performance and two factors were 
used to rate the subjects' performance, these were balance and 
rhythm. Balance was defined as the ability to make postural 
adjustments with respect to the pull of gravity. Judges who 
rated the task found they could more easily decide whether a 
subject was off balance, rather than assess how well the 
movements were executed per se. Similarly, in the case of 
rhythm the judges were instructed to look for a regular pattern 
which emerged over trials for any one subject. Each of these 
factors was rated on a five-point scale and the fluency of 
performance was the sum of both scores. In order to test 
the reliability of this measure the video tapes were rated by 
two judges. The Spearman Rank correlation coefficient between 
these judges was 0.87. It should be noted that no a. priori 
claims are being made about the independence of these various 
measures of performance.
RESULTS
Each performance measure was analysed by a three-way mixed 
AHOVA with Inspection Time and Task Difficulty as between 
subjects factor and Trials as a within subjects factor. I
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FIGURE 7. Mean number of errors for all the various groups, TE-30 task easy,
30 seconds, TE-120 task easy 120 seconds, TD-30 task difficult 30 seconds, TD-
120 task difficult 120 seconds,
FIGURE 8, The mean number of errors for all groups as a function of the 
serial position of the error, TE-30 task easy 30 seconds, TE-12G task easv 
120 seconds) TD-30 task difficult SO seconds, TO-120 task difficult 120
seconde,
FIGURE 7. Mean number of errors for ail the various groups. TE-30 task easy,
30 seconds, TE-120 task easy 120 seconds, TD-30 task difficult 30 seconds, TD-
120 task difficult 120 seconds,
FIGURE 8, The mean number of errors for all groups as a function of the
serial position of the error, TE-30 task easy 30 seconds. TE-120 task easy 
120 seconds, TD-30 task difficult 30 seconds, TD-120 task difficult 120 
seconds,
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Sequence Learning
Sequence learning was measured by the number of errors 
made on each trial. Figure Seven illustrates the mean number 
of errors on each trial. All groups showed a progressive 
decrease in the number of errors per trial, F <6,96) = 6.87, 
P<0.01. Irrespective of the length of instruction time, however, 
subjects performing the easy task made fewer errors than those 
performing the difficult task, F (1.16) = 20.8, p<.01.
Similarly, those subjects with the longer inspection time made 
fewer errors than those with the shorter inspection time, F
(1.16) = 12.2, p<.01. There was no significant interaction 
between the effects of Task Difficulty and Inspection Time, 
F (1.16) = 4,11, n.s., and neither of these factors was involved 
in interactions with Trials, F<1, in all cases.
Figure Eight shows the number of errors for each groups 
averaged over all acquisition trials as a function of the
serial position of the error. Subjects performing the difficult 
task with an inspection time of 30 seconds showed pronounced 
recency and primacy effects. A similar pattern was shown by 
subjects performing the difficult task with 120 inspection 
time, although the effect was not as marked. There was no
evidence for such an effect on the easy condition.
Speed
Figure Nine shows all groups performed faster with
experience, F (6.96) = 8.47, P<0.01, and that irrespective of
instruction time, subjects performing the easy task were faster 
than those performing the difficult task, F (1.16) = 12.1,
p<0.01, although in this case there was no significant effect
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rI6URE 10. Mean perforr^snce rating of the various groups, TE-30 task easy 30 
seconGS; TE-120 task easy 120 seconds, TD-30 task difficult 30 seconds, TD-120 
task difficult 120 seconds,
i
Q
bJ
K
to
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
1 2 3 4
TRIAL
ü
z
Z
oc
i
tü
co1
2
FIGURE 9
6
OOTE-12C)
4
3
2
1
3 4
T R I A L
FIGURE 10
of inspection time, F<1. Figure Nine does suggest/hov/ever, /
that Inspection Time had an effect in the difficult condition 
but this was not supported by a significant Difficulty x 
Inspection Time interaction, F(1.16) = 1,45 p> .10. There was / /
; A
however, a significant Difficulty x Trials interaction, F(6,96)
= 2.45, P<.05 which possibly reflects the greater increase in 
speed shown in the early condition. All other interactions
involving Trials failed to reach significance (all F(6.96)'s 
<1.70).
Fluency
The third measure of performance was a qualitative 
assessment of the movements which also showed a general 
improvement across trials, F (6.96) = 10.33, P<.01, Figure Ten 
displays the mean ratings of each group and reveals that 
irrespective of instruction time subjects performed the easy 
task with greater fluency than those performing the difficult 
task, F (1.16) = 13.50, p<.01.
The graphic data suggests that there was an interaction 
between task difficulty and inspection time although the 
presence of this interaction was not supported by statistical 
analysis. Neither the main effect of Instruction Time, F (1.16)
= 1.43, p>.10, nor the Instruction Time x Difficulty, F (1.16) =
/' I
2.64 were not significant. There were no significant ' {
interactions involving Trials F (6.96 
csses-r'
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D i s c u s s i o n
The runway task would seem to be an excellent paradigm for 
the proposed investigations, as performance at least in terms 
of the sequence errors is susceptible to both the difficulty of 
the sequence, and manipulation of inspection time. Moreover, 
this measure also showed a typical acquisition function and 
serial position error function. The other two measures did not 
appear to be as sensitive to the manipulation of inspection 
time, although they did show reasonable acquisition functions 
and differentiated tasks of varying difficulty. On balance 
this pattern of results suggests that the tests and measures 
are suitable for the acquisition of a complex interactive skill 
and consequently I decided to adopt this paradigm in future 
investigations of the mental practice phenomena.
The Runway
In order to overcome some of the difficulties encountered in 
timing, and to provide feedback correction to the subject 
during execution a more sophisticated runway was designed and 
constructed. A rubber mat 20 feet long was divided into 
fourteen adjacent squares (34 cm x 34 cm). Each square was 
covered with electrically conductive paint (Johnson Matthey 
Type ESP 15) and separately connected to one pole of an 
electronic switch. During performance the subject was 
connected to the other pole via an electrode attached to the 
skin flap between the thumb and forefinger of the left hand. 
As the subject performed the task barefoot, this system 
allowed the control and recording .apparatus to detect when 
they were in contact with any particular square.
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The first pair of squares will be referred to as the 
start squares, and as soon as the subject lifted either foot 
from these squares, a break in the electronic switch started a 
timer, this was stopped automatically when the subject made 
contact with either of the last pair of squares. The control 
apparatus allowed any square of the remaining 12 pairs to be 
wired with a specific sequence. This could include the 
following alternatives; the right square, the left square both 
squares and neither square. If the subject made contact with a 
•wired‘ square an electronic counter was incremented and a 
feedback tone was generated for as long as the subject 
maintained contact with that square. In the experiments to be 
reported the subjects task was to traverse the runway stepping 
only on those squares designated as correct. On the runway 
any sequence could include the following movements; two feet to 
two feet, two feet to one foot or one foot to one foot. 
Overall, the movement sequence was similar to a complex form 
of hop-scotch.
e :x : ï ^ e :r i  j y c E i i r T  t w o
Introduction
The primary aim of the next experiment was to extend 
Dickinson's (1978) findings on the beneficial effects of mental 
practice to an interactive skill. Subjects received mental 
practice prior to experience with the task and were then 
required to traverse the runway, using trial and error 
learning. Their performance was assessed in terms of three 
performance measures, sequence error, speed and fluency. A
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second aim was to see whether the effect of mental practice 
depends upon the stage at which it is introduced. In the
earlier discussion of the various explanations of mental 
practice it was pointed out that the stage at which such 
practice is introduced might be a critical factor.
The proposal is that the symbolic representation of the 
task is sequential in nature and that it is this aspect that 
must be acquired before the appropriate movements can be made. 
Therefore, if we present subjects with the symbolic 
information, in this case the step sequence, and give them the 
opportunity to mentally rehearse it, then such rehearsal 
should enchance learning when the time for action arrives.
The second aim of this study was to assess the 
effectiveness of mental practice with reference to the stage at 
which it is introduced. If mental practice functions by 
consolidating some form of motor 'image', then prior experience 
of the task would be required in order for the subject to 
operate on that image. By contrast, if mental practice 
operates on some form of symbolic representation, however, then 
such practice could be effective in the absence of actual 
performance.
In this study the subjects were required to traverse the 
runway as quickly and accurately as possible, stepping only on 
the square designated as correct. One group received mental 
practice prior to exposure to the task, and as they had no 
previous experience with it guidance cues had to be presented 
during mental practice. These cues were provided by overlaying 
the runway with cardboard foot-prints illustrating the correct 
sequence. The physical practice group actually performed
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Fi6uKt I !, A schematic diagram of the runway showing the movement secuence,
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traverses of the runway in the presence of these same guidance 
cues, whereas the no-practice group had no training prior to 
initial acquisition. Equivalent groups were run in which 
subjects had some previous knowledge of the task, in that they 
performed initial acquisition trials, prior to their various 
treatments.
METHOD
Subjects
Thirty-six female students aged between 18 and 25 years 
were randomly assigned to one of six groups; early guided 
mental practice (GKP), early guided physical practice (GPP), 
early no-practice (NP) and late guided mental practice (GMP/L), 
late guided physical practice (GPP/L) and late no-practice 
(KP/L)
Apparatus
The runway was the twenty foot long rubber mat as 
described earlier. Across the successive twelve pairs of
squares the following were designated as correct; left, right, 
left, left and right, right, left and right, left and right, 
right, right, left. The sequence included the following 
transitions: two feet to two feet, two feet to one foot, one 
foot to two feet, and one foot to one foot. This sequence is 
illustrated in Figure Eleven.
In order for a record to be made of the subjects 
performance a video recording was made of all subjects on 
every trial using a Sony Videocorder and a Sony camera fitted
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with a wide angle lens. The video recordings were used for 
rating the subjects fluency.
Procedure
The experiment was divided into three stages: pre-training, 
training and test. <See^J>bî^One) During test the subject's
task was to traverse the runway stepping on only those ^
squares designated as correct. If the subject made contact ^
with an error square a feedback tone sounded informing the 
subject that the square was not part of the correct sequence.
Pre-Training
During pre-training subjects in Group GMP/L, GPP/L and NP/L 
performed five trial and error traverses of the runway with 
feedback correction.
Training
Following pre-training Group GMP/L were instructed to 
imagine themselves performing the task. Each subject stood on 
the two start squares and performed ten imaginary trials. 
Subjects were asked to turn their heads to the right following 
the completion of each imaginary trial so the experimenter 
could record the number of trials completed. During imaginary 
practice the guidance cues were used, to ensure the subject 
rehearsed the correct sequence. For subjects in Group GPP/L 
the same conditions applied except that these subjects were 
required to actually perform the task. While Group GMP/L and 
GPP/L received their different types of practice, Group NP/L 
completed a simple reading task.
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The subjects in the early condition Groups GKP and. GPP had 
no pre-training, and did not experience the task prior to their 
five guided mental, or physical practice trials respectively. 
The no-practice group (IfP) in the early condition had no 
training at this stage.
Test
Following training all six groups performed fifteen test 
trials, without guidance using trial and error learning. The 
only feedback they received about the correctness of their 
performance occurred as the movements were executed. Subjects 
had a three-way decision to make at each pair of squares; that 
is, was the right foot, the left foot, or both feet correct.
Measures Of Performance
The performance of subjects during test was assessed in 
terms of three measures; sequence error, speed and fluency.
RESULTS ^
/ I
Sequence Learning
Figure Twelve illustrates sequence learning of the different 
groups in the early and late conditions. The error scores were 
analysed by a three-way mixed analysis of variance with the 
training condition (Group) and the time of training, early 
versus late (Stage) as between subject factors and trials as a
within subject factor, Tn— ^both--±h.e_-early--and-date conditions 0  cJ^
the error rate decreased over trials, F (4,120) = 15.96, P<.01,
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and on average fewer errors occurred in the late condition 
than in the early condition, F (2,30) = 7.97, P<.01.
Although the presence of a significant main effect of 
groups, F (2.30) = 4,05 P<.05, indicates that performance was 
affected by the training condition, a significant Stage x Group 
X Trial Interaction, F (8,120) = 2.32, P<.05, supports the
suggestion in the graphic data (Figure Twelve) that the size of 
this effect depended upon the time of training and trial. In 
order to explore this significant interaction, the sequence 
errors were analysed separately for the early and late 
conditions using the mean square error rate from the overall 
analysis. These analyses revealed a significant effect of 
groups in the early condition, F (2,30) = 6,74, P<,01, but not in 
the late condition F<1, Individual comparisons by the 
Keuman-Keuls procedure showed that subjects in Groups GMP and 
GPP committed fewer errors than subjects in Group NP in the 
early condition, P<,05 in both cases.
Speed
Figure Thirteen illustrates the speed of the various groups 
in the early and late conditions. In both conditions speed of 
performance of all groups improved over trials, F (4,120) = 
29,17, P<,01, although there was no difference in the speed of 
subjects in the early and late conditions, F<,1, Overall 
however, there was a significant effect of groups, F (2,30) =
P8,1^, P<,01, Although the graphic data suggest the groups
difference were largely confined to the early conditions, the
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F H U R E  14, Mean fluency ratings of the various groups in the early (top 
panel) and late conditions (bottom panel), GMP, guided mental practice; GPP, 
guided physical practice; NP, no-practice,
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Group X Stage interaction just failed to reach the conventional 
level of significance, F (2,30) = n.s. Even so, in an ?  .
attempt to fully characterise the data separate analyses were 
conducted for the early and late conditions. These revealed a 
significant effect of groups in the early condition, F (2,30) =
10.56, P<.01, but not in the late, F(2.30) = 1.80, n.s.
Individual comparisons showed that Group GKP was significantly 
faster than Group GPP, which in turn was faster than Group FP, 
in the early condition, P<.05 in all cases. Ueither of the 
between subjects factors entered into significant interaction 
with Trials, F (4,120) =1.59; F (8,120X1.83, P>0.05 in both
cases.
Fluency
Figure Fourteen illustrates the quality of performance 
scores of the various groups in the early and late conditions.
The fluency of performance improved over trials, F (4,120) =
17.07, P<.01, but the effect of groups did not reach
significance, F (2,30) = 3.05, n.s.
The absence of a significant Group x Stage interaction,
F (2,30) = 1.27, n.s; failed to confirm the suggestion in
Figure Fourteen that the effect of groups was more pronounced 
in the early condition than in the late condition. The Trials 
factor did not enter into any significant interaction, f| i in 
all cases.
D I S C U S S I O N
The major finding of this study is that when guided mental 
practice is given before the subject has actual experience of
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the task* performance is improved on two evaluative measures; 
sequence learning and speed of performance, and on the third 
measure (fluency) the trend is in the same direction (though 
not significant). On the sequence and speed measures in all 
cases Group GMP was superior to the control group, Group NP, 
in the early condition. Moreover in terms of speed, guided 
mental practice given initially was more effective than 
comparable physical practice. The advantage conferred by
mental practice was evident from the outset of testing and 
continued throughout the test. This suggests that mental 
practice does not act by speeding up the rate of learning of 
the task, but rather, confers some constant positive advantage 
to the subject. Because the training period was limited, we
cannot be certain whether or not this advantage would remain 
static.
At the present time it is impossible to state explicitly 
whether changes in speed and fluency of performance are 
secondary to changes in sequence learning, rather than
reflecting an independent effect of mental practice on
performance. As I pointed out earlier. Summers (1977) has 
suggested that planning during skill acquisition is in terms 
of the redundancy of information. Once the subject has 
knowledge about the order or sequence of events, they can 
direct attentional capacity elsewhere. From this point of view 
it would be reasonable to conclude that the improvement in 
speed and quality is likely to be secondary to changes in 
sequence learning. Such an account may well allow us to 
understand one of the more surprising aspects of the data,
namely that the mental practice group was superior to the
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physical practice group in terms of the speed measure in the 
early condition.
It is often assumed that movement generation mechanisms are 
overseen by some form of executive system which monitors both 
the formation of an action plan, and the control of 
performance. Thus it is possible that in Group GPP in the
early condition conflicting demands are made on this executive 
between the formation of the action plan and the handing over 
of control to effector mechanisms which regulate performance. 
For the subjects in Group GKP the situation is different,
however, as they have the opportunity to structure and organise 
the action plan, prior to the hand over to, and without
interference from effector and performance control 
mechanisms. This results in more executive capacity being made 
available to oversee learning of the sequence during the
training stage and thus relieves subjects of this task during
the test stage. As a result they are then in a position to
direct more processing capacity to the performance aspects of 
the task during test which is reflected in their speed of
execution.
Fitts and Posner (1967) characterised the stages of skill 
learning, the initial stage being the cognitive phase. If
mental practice is the manipulation of cognitive aspects of the 
skill, then it it easy to understand why such practice is 
beneficial during early learning. Fitts and Posner state, "at 
this stage behaviour is truly a patchwork of old habits ready 
to be put together into new patterns". The present findings 
suggest that not only does guided mental practice facilitate 
the selection and planning of past movement experience to form
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a new motor schema, together with its associated programs, but 
also that such facilitation is manifest in the quality of the 
movements themselves.
The present study was not successful in its secondary aim 
of determining whether the effectiveness of mental practice
depended upon the stage of learning at which it was
administered. Although none of the measures revealed a 
significant effect of treatment in the late condition, the 
statistical analyses did not provide strong grounds for 
concluding that the effects of these treatments differed in the 
early and late conditions; only in the case of sequence error 
was the interaction involving Group and Stage significant.
Two other problems also arise in the case of the late 
condition. The first is that at least in the case of sequence
error a floor effect may have been operating to constrain the
difference between groups; the error rate in the late condition 
was uniformly low in all groups. Secondly, as guided physical 
practice failed to improve performance significantly above the 
level of the no-practice group, it may be argued that at this 
stage of learning performance measures are insensitive to any 
treatment procedure.
In conclusion, this study does demonstrate the effectiveness 
of mental practice in enhancing performance on an
1
interactive gross motor ski 1 certadnTy=z^wheh:^ such.^.pract:ice
is,_gija3n_-ppdc)r-d:orrex^ This enhancement
can be seen in measures such as learning the sequence of 
movements, and the speed with which they are performed. The 
idea that subjects need time to structure the movement plans
w-
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which might involve strategies for success, prior to execution 
of the movements themselves, is supported by this study.
T H R E E
Introduction
In Experiment Two the mental practice effect was 
demonstrated using a procedure in which information was 
provided by external guidance cues in the form of footprints 
on the runway. Would similar effects emerge without these 
guidance cues, where mental practice processes were forced to 
operate on stored information? This next study investigated 
this question, subjects were required to learn a sequence of 
movement before adjusting to a change in the sequence. 
Subjects would then use mental practice to restructure their 
prior movement experiences in order to generate the modified 
version of the sequence.
In order to provide subjects with information they were 
required to learn a particular sequence on the runway and once 
this was well learned, perform a reversal of that sequence. 
The mental practice group imagined performing the sequence 
reversal, before being tested on the task. If mental practice 
can operate on stored information, we should expect this group 
to learn the reversal more rapidly than a no-practice control 
group. In addition, a physical practice group was also
included to compare the efficacy of mental and physical 
practice with this procedure.
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METHOD
Subjects
Eighteen female students between 16 and 25 years of age 
were randomly assigned to one of three groups; mental practice 
(MP), physical practice (PP) and no-practice (NP).
Apparatus
The runway was a shortened version of that described in 
Experiment Two. There were nine pairs of squares, and the 
first and last pairs were used for timing with the remaining 
squares making up the sequence to be learned.
Procedure
The experiment was divided into three stages; pre-training, 
training and test.
Pre-Training
During pre-training all subjects were required to traverse 
the runway stepping only on those squares designated as 
correct. If the subject stood on an incorrect square that was 
not part of the sequence to be learned, the feedback tone 
sounded informing them that the square was not part of the 
sequence. All subjects performed the task until they reached a 
criterion of five consecutively correct traverses of the 
runway. The sequence was; both feet, right foot, left foot, 
both feet, left foot, neither foot and both feet.
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Training
During training subjects in the mental practice group were 
instructed to imagine themselves performing the task in 
reverse. Subjects stood on the last pair of squares facing in 
the opposite direction to that used during the initial pre­
training, and they were instructed to imagine themselves 
performing the task in reverse. Subjects were required to turn 
their head to the right on the completion of each imaginary 
traverse of the runway, which allowed the experimenter to count 
the number of mental practice trials completed. Subjects 
performed five trials using this procedure. Subjects in the 
physical practice group performed five actual practice trials 
without feedback correction, whereas those in the no-practice 
group performed a simple reading task, for a period of ninety 
seconds. In neither the mental or physical groups were there 
any cues indicating the correct sequence.
Test
All groups performed five test trials of the reversed 
version of the task with feedback correction.
As Experiment Two failed to reveal a significant mental 
practice effect for the fluency measure performance, the five 
test trials was analysed only in terms of sequence error and 
speed measures.
RESULTS ' ^  XL
There were no significant differences in performance of the 
various groups during pre-training, either in terms of the
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number of trials to criterion, F (2.15) = 2.27, n.s. or in speed 
on the last trial of pre-training, F (2.15) = 2.15, n.s.
Sequence Learning
Figure Fifteen illustrates sequence errors for the different 
groups during the five test trials. All groups showed a 
decrease in errors over trials with the mental practice group 
showing the lowest scores. An overall analysis revealed 
significant effects of groups, F (2.15) = 2.87, P<.05, and
effect of trials, F (4.60)= 2.87, P<.05. The Group x Trial 
interaction however, was not significant, F<1. Individual 
comparisons showed that subjects in Group MP committed fewer 
errors than subjects in Groups NP and PP, P( .05.
Speed
Figures Sixteen illustrates the speed of performance of all 
three groups in the five test trials. In all groups speed 
improved over trials, F (4.60) = 4.15, P<.01. There was a 
significant effect of groups, F (2.15) = 3.99, P<,05, and
individual comparisons showed that Group MP were significantly 
faster than Group PP, P<.05. The Group x Trial interaction was 
not significant F<1.
DISCUSSION
The pattern of results in Experiment Three are similar to 
those seen in Experiment Two, in that mental practice did 
facilitate performance of the sequence reversal, relative to the 
physical practice and no-practice groups. Although the mental 
practice group appeared superior to the two other groups on
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the speed measure, the statistical analysis revealed a
significant difference only between the mental practice group 
and the physical practice group. Therefore, it is not certain 
whether mental practice conferred an advantage in terms of 
speed or that physical practice resulted in an unfavourable 
climate for performance. The data would suggest that both 
influences contributed to this effect.
These results indicate that the processes engaged by mental 
practice can operate on stored information. Furthermore, it is 
proposed that enforced processing of this information during 
execution, which is the case in the physical practice group, 
may lead to interference between the formation of an action 
plan and the handing over of control to effector mechanisms 
which oversee performance. It is clear that if subjects have 
the opportunity to organise the action plan prior to 
performance, then execution of the movements themselves is 
improved.
If what the subjects learned in this study was a specific 
sequence of movements which was under the control of a fixed 
motor program, then the reversal of the sequence should have 
made performance worse. But if what is represented in such a 
program, can be accessed by purely cognitive procedures, in 
this case mental rehearsal, then performance of the sequence 
reversal should show minimal deterioration, as was the case 
with the mental practice group. As mental practice did enhance 
performance of the reversal, then it is reasonable to assume 
that sequence information is represented either within the 
executive control mechanism or as a parameter of the motor 
program for this sequence of movements. Moreover, these
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results demonstrate that subjects who use mental practice can 
make simple transformations on motor information that is 
stored in either of these systems.
The idea of making transformations on stored information is 
not a new one. It is analogous to the transformational rules 
that are a feature of certain linguistic theories (Williams 
1976). Moreover, such rules are possibly one of the features 
associated with motor programs which are at the heart of 
schema theory. A motor schema consists of rules and 
relationships which are capable of generating new actions and 
are thought to be one method by which individuals can create 
new motor "plans from past movement experiences. The success 
of mental practice on sequence reversal supports the general 
idea that movement information is represented at a high level 
within the CNS in the form of cognitive structures. Given this 
perspective it would appear that these structures can be 
manipulated by purely psychological processes which do not 
necessarily involve concoramitant motor activity.
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Introduction
The earlier experiments demonstrated that mental practice 
can enhance the performance of an interactive motor skill; 
furthermore, individuals are capable of making simple 
transformations on stored motor information using mental 
practice to modify a previously experienced sequence of 
movements. Given these results, we now turn to an analysis 
of the mechanisms that might underlie the mental practice 
effect. A starting point is the assumption that mental 
practice influences the structuring and processing of 
information prior to execution of a sequence of movements. 
Seen from this perspective, the problem becomes one of 
specifying the nature of this information and how it is 
involved in the movement generation system. One proposal 
that has received much attention; (Shaw, 1940; Ulrich,1967; 
Suinn, 1970; Rawlings and Rawlings, 1974) is that mental 
practice involves the manipulation of a mental image.
The psychological literature reveals an abundance of 
attempts to measure imagery and its possible contribution to 
learning and memory. In 1910 Galton designed one of the 
first imagery questionnaires with a view to differentiating 
between different types of imagery; for example visual, 
kinesthetic and auditory. There has been little success, 
however, in classifying individuals into specific types of 
imagers, possibly due to the subjective nature of these
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investigations. The search for such innate or acquired 
habits to think either in pictures or in words, has largely 
been abandoned as it appears that most individuals can 
experience the various types of imagery, depending upon 
circumstances.
Recent investigations into the nature of imagery as 
related to movement skills are now more objective with the 
emphasis on spatial and transformation abilities. Research 
in this area has demonstrated individual differences on 
this basis. Just and Carpenter (1985) have reported that 
though differences between high and low spatial ability 
individuals , may be small the resulting differences in 
performance can be large and very general. They propose 
that those individuals with high spatial ability are faster 
in their manipulations and more flexible in their approach 
on mental rotation tasks such as the Shepard and Metzler 
rotation task. Using this task Just et al. demonstrated 
both error rate and reaction time increases for subjects 
with low spatial abilities.
Current studies of the movement generation system call 
upon the notion of an image in order to explain various 
processes. Adamsy' (1976) refers to ^'s perceptual trace as a ^
'motor image' which is strengthened as a result of 
experience, whereas Gentile (1977) suggests that an image 
or plan exists to guide execution of the movements to be 
performed. The type of image referred to here is one 
associated with closed loop theories of motor control and is 
not necessarily activated prior to action. In this form the 
image acts as a model against which performance can be
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compared. By contrast, the image in which we are interested 
is that which is constructed prior to the execution of any 
movement. The idea is that individuals pre-select movements 
prior to performance and this enables them to predict what 
will happen once they begin to move.
The concept of an anticipatory image (Scott, Kelso and 
Wallace 1978) has been presented as the basis on which motor 
commands could be organised; Scott et al state that, "when 
we pre-select a movement, we obtain information that is in 
terms of our expectations". They further propose that this 
anticipatory motor image will create within the individual a 
readiness to receive specific types of information.
Moreover, as individuals have prior knowledge of the 
sensory consequences of their actions the processing of 
input information is enhanced. Finally, this internal 
image of the movements to be performed, and the organisation 
of the motor commands are closely linked. This form of
imaging is thought to result in the superior regulation of
movements once execution is underway. It may well be that 
the anticipatory image is constructed on the basis of an 
individuals' past movement experiences, in which case they 
may be predisposed to use various methods of imagery 
construction which would result in individual differences.
Imagery And Mental Practice
Pear (1922) was the first to suggest the possible
relationship between imagery and mental practice; he argued 
that individuals who had never performed a particular
sequence of movements were capable of combining them in
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imagination to produce a reasonably successful performance 
when the time for action came. The literature on mental 
practice reveals some controversy about the type of imagery 
which might be associated with such practice. One question 
which has interested researchers in this area is the 
viewpoint the subject takes when engaged in mental 
practice. Two possibilities are open to them: first they
could imagine themselves, or some primitive human model 
performing the movements. Second, the practice may be 
"viewed" from the spectator’s viewpoint. Shick (1970)
attempted to examine this problem. Using two tasks, the 
wall volley and the serve, she found that the imagery 
employed depended on the skill to be achieved. Subjects 
performing the service task reported that imagery took the 
form of a spectator’s view of the skill, whereas those who 
imagined executing the wall volley reported that they 
visualised themselves performing the task. Suinn (1970) 
has reported that one of the critical factors in his VKBR, 
(visuo-motor behaviour) practice technique is that self 
participation is essential for any benefit to accrue from 
mental practice.
Bawling and Rawlings (1974) examined the relationship 
between visual imagery and mental practice. Efficiency of 
imagery was measured by Gordons (1950) test of imagery 
manipulation and subjects were classified according to this 
questionnaire as ’controlled’ or ’autonomous’ imagers. 
Using the pursuit rotor task, they were given five minutes 
of physical practice followed by ten minutes rest before 
five minutes post rest practice. During the rest period
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groups of subjects mentally rehearsed the task for three 
minutes, at the end, middle or beginning of the rest period. 
Controlled imagers showed less reminiscence than autonomous 
imagers. Rawlings et al concluded that controlled imagery 
results in a build up of inhibition, and this is reflected 
in a decrement in reminiscence. The implication of this 
study is that mental practice may build up inhibition in the 
same way as physical practice.
Another aspect of imagery which has been the subject of 
investigation is its vividness, and the ease with which it 
can be manipulated. Start and Richardson (1964) used an 
imagery battery designed by Sutcliffe which purported to 
measure vividness and modality of imagery. Subjects were 
rated for imagery on each of seven modalities: visual,
auditory, touch, kinesthetic, taste, smell and organic. 
Using the single leg upstart task all subjects received six 
daily mental practice periods of five minutes, using an 
instruction sheet. Then on day seven they were tested on 
the task. Neither vividness, nor the controllability of 
imagery related to the performance scores of subjects.
There is evidence from subjective reports that imagery 
is used during mental practice, but there is very little 
experimental work to support this claim. It seems
plausible that if subjects imagine a sequence of movements 
then imagery must be involved. The question is what form 
might such imagery take? The alternative is that subjects 
use some other strategy to encode the information to be 
stored. A deceptively simple form of symbolic
representation of the sequence for the runway task is a
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verbal one. Subjects in Experiment Three were informally 
questioned following their participation on the runway task, 
and claimed that during both initial learning, and sequence 
reversal they did not use a verbal code, although a few said 
they began by trying a verbal strategy. This was achieved 
by naming the steps, however, they admitted this method 
was soon abandoned in favour of either a location code, 
which was described as picturing where to put their feet, or 
a kinesthetic code which was characterised by a feeling of 
what to do at a particular point on the runway. These 
points were emphasised when subjects discussed strategies 
for reversing the sequence.
As a result of discussions with these subjects and the 
association of imagery with mental practice in the 
literature I decided to investigate whether individual 
differences in a specific imagery ability was allied with 
mental practice. Consequently, a decision had to be made 
about the type of imagery that might be most appropriate to
JT a "to
such practice and design a test that would access this 
ability. It seemed plausible to assume that the ability 
to manipulate a visuo-spatial representation would 
correlate with improvements in performance brought about by 
mental practice. It has been suggested that those subjects 
with high spatial abilities are able to construct 
orientation-free structural representations due to a more 
complete understanding of the nature of the object 
(Shephard 1975), If this is so then such processes may 
include representations of the human body.
t /
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From the historical perspective researchers have 
believed that there exists a system of 'primary' mental 
abilities or factors which are assumed to be reflected in 
fundamental psychological processes, one of which is spatial 
thinking (S factor) Thurstone (1941). This factor is thought 
to be involved in all tasks that require the manipulation of 
two or three dimensional objects in the imagination. 
Fleishman (1950) has argued that the S factor may be a 
crucial component of imagery during mental practice, 
particularly during early learning. The S factor has three 
components:-
1) The ability to visualize rigid constructions moved 
into different positions,
2) The ability to visualize a configuration in which there is 
a displacement of parts,
3) A kinesthetic factor,
Thurstones' Flags Test is a measure of spatial 
thinking, however, the original test used abstract forms, 
such as squares and circles, and thus constituted a measure 
of a generalised spatial ability. These abstract two 
dimensional forms fail to capture some important aspects of 
human spatial ability as we are able to imagine the movement 
of an object from one orientation to any other very easily. 
It may be that the subject's internal representations that 
are associated with spatial transformations involving the 
human body are not tapped by rotation tests that consist of 
abstract forms. Therefore, the effect of mental practice 
on motor performance may depend upon a more specific 
ability which would allow subjects to manipulate a symbolic
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FIGURE 17 - Items from Flags Test and Stickman Test
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representation of the huimn body, The use of @ primitive 
body image such as a stickman was supported by evidence from 
Parsons (1987) study. He suggests that imagined spatial 
transformations of the body probably reflect the dynamic 
properties of actual movement. Furthermore, Cooper and 
Shepard (1975) have noted that kinesthetic sensations do 
accompany spatial transformations that are associated with 
the human body. Consequently,the Stickman Test was designed 
in an attempt to capture these specific abilities.
The items in the Flags Test and the Stickman test are 
similar, except for the fact that the latter employs stick 
figures, rather than the abstract geometric forms used in 
the Flags Test. The figure used in the Stickman Test is 
based on the assumption that movement imagery is a result of 
prior perceptual experience, and that all adults have 
through these experiences constructed a form of primitive 
body image, of which the stick figure is an elementary 
version. The human body is familiar to all individuals and 
may well have spatial transformations of its whole or parts 
associated with it.
The Stickman Test consists of a standard figure and a 
comparison figure. Subjects were required to state whether 
or not the comparison figure was a rotation of the standard, 
in the same plane of the paper. (See Figure Seventeen) They 
were required to complete as many items as possible in a 
fixed time period (two minutes),
The validity of the Stickman Test was determined by 
correlation with Flags Test for sixty-two subjects^ 26 males 
and 36 females aged between 18 and 25 years. However, the
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FIGURE 16, Experiment Four. Number of correct items 
completed on Flaqs and Stickman Tests,
FIGURE 19, Relationship between the number of correct 
items completed in the two halves of Stickman Test,
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correlation coefficient of concurrent validity should not be 
too high, particularly when using equivalent form tests 
otherwise the second test could be regarded as a replication 
of the existent test (Cronbach (1977). Figure Eighteen 
illustrates the relationship between the number of correct 
items completed on Flags and Stickman tests. The Pearson 
Product-moment correlation between these scores was 0.43, 
P<,01. The expectation is that the Stickman Test will 
measure another aspect of imagery which is more relevant to 
movement related tasks.
Reliability was assessed using the split-half method. 
Figure Nineteen displays the relationship between the number 
of correct items completed in the two halves of the test 
The Pearson Product-moment correlation coefficient was 0.59 
which rose to 0.74 after application of the Spearman-Brown 
formulae. The correlation coefficient for the total-length 
test was 0.82, P<.01.
With the validity and reliability of the Stickman Test 
assessed as above, it was hoped that it would represent a 
valid measure of the subject's ability to manipulate a 
spatial representation relevant to the human body. Shepard 
and Metzler (1971) had demonstrated that subjects could 
solve the types of rotational problems found in the 
Stickman Test, and suggested that subjects were able to 
accomplish this by rotating a mental image of the target 
obj ect.
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This study is an attempt to demonstrate that individuals 
who show a specific imagery ability will produce a better 
performance on the runway task, following mental practice, 
when compared to those who do not possess this ability. 
The experiment was divided into two stages; first, the 
screening of subjects to find their imagery scores, and 
second participation on the task following mental practice. 
After screening subjects were classified into groups on the 
basis of their scores on the Stickman Test. These were two 
matched groups of high-scoring subjects and two matched 
groups of low scoring subjects. All subjects were then 
tested on the runway using the sequence reversal procedure 
as detailed in Experiment Three, with one high and one low 
score group receiving mental practice and the other pair no­
practice.
If mental practice depends on employing a form of imagery 
that is captured by the Stickman Test then we should expect 
to observe greater differences between the mental practice 
and no-practice condition when the subjects have a high 
imagery rating. In addition, this experiment could provide 
validation of the hypothesis that the Stickman Test measures 
capacities normally deployed in motor learning. Given this 
supposition it could be expected that subjects with high 
imagery scores would learn the initial task more effectively 
than those with low scores.
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METHOD
Subjects And Screening
Seventy-seven female subjects, aged between 16-25 years 
were given the Stickman Test, and required to complete as 
many items as possible in a two minute period. The raw 
scores from all subjects were used to allocate them to two 
high-score and two low-score groups of six subjects each. 
Six matched pairs of subjects were selected from the low 
scoring subjects and one member of each pair was assigned to 
a mental practice group (Group MP-L) and the other to a no­
practice group (HP-L>. The same procedure was followed for 
high scoring subjects to generate another mental practice 
group (Group MP-L) and a no-practice group (Group NP-L). 
The mean Stickman Test scores were: MP-L, 12.3; NP-L, 11.0; 
MP-H, 31.0; NP-H, 30.5.
Apparatus
The shortened version of the runway was employed and the 
procedure was the same as that used in Experiment Three. 
Subjects were required to learn the sequence using a trial 
and error method and received feedback correction until they 
reached a criterion of three consecutively correct traverses 
of the runway. Following this the mental practice subjects 
performed five mental practice trials using the reversed 
sequence and the no-practice groups performed a simple 
reading task. Finally, all subjects performed five test 
trials using the reversed sequence and receiving feedback 
correction.
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RESULTS
An analysis of the number of trials to criterion during 
initial training revealed that subjects with high imagery 
scores learned the task faster than those with low imagery 
scores, t(ll) = 2,31, P<0.05. The mean trials to criterion
for the high scoring subjects was 9.5 and for low scoring
subjects was 15.3.
Performance during the five test trials with the reversed 
sequence was measured in terms of the number of errors on
each trial, (sequence learning) and the time taken to
complete one traverse of the runway, (speed). These scores 
were analysed by a three-way mixed ANÜVA with type of 
training (mental practice vs no-practice) and imagery level 
as between-subject factors, and the number of test trials as 
a witiin-subject factor. |C
Sequence
Figure Twenty illustrates the mean number of errors on 
each test trial. Subjects in the mental practice condition 
made on average less than one error on the first trial, 
whereas subjects in the no-practice condition committed 
substantially more errors. With extended testing this 
difference disappeared due to the improvement in the no­
practice condition. There was a significant effect of 
training condition, F(l,20) = 4.41, P<0.05, and a
significant Training x Trials interaction, F (4,80) = 3.03,
P<0.05.
Error scores of the subjects was unaffected by their 
imagery rating: there was no significant effect of imagery
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FIGURE 20, Mean number of sequence errors during the 
test trials, MP-H, mental practice/high score; MP-L, 
mental practice/low score; NP-H, no-practice/high 
score; NP-L, no-practice/low score,
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FIGURE 21, Mean speed of the various groups during 
the test trials, MP-H, mental practice/high score; 
MP-L, mental practice low score; NP-H, no­
practice/high score; NP-L, no-practice low score.
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level, F (1,20) - 1.14, n,s., and no significant
interactions involving this factor, F<1 in all cases.
Speed
Figure Twenty—one displays the speed of performance 
during the test trials. From the outset of testing, 
subjects in the mental practice condition performed faster 
than those in the no-practice condition and this difference 
was sustained across all the test trials during which there 
was a progressive increase in speed. There was a 
significant main effect of training condition, F (1,20) = 
5,00, F<,05, and trials F (4,80) = 16,43, P<0,05, although 
there was no significant interaction between these two 
factors F<1,
There was no evidence that subjects with high imagery 
scores benefited more from mental practice in terms of speed 
performance than those with low scores. In fact Figure 
Nineteen shows that the low scorers tended to show the 
greater increment in speed relative to the no—practice
control condition following mental practice, at least during 
initial learning. This difference was not significant,
however; the main effect of imagery and all interaction
involving this factor failed to reach significance,
DISCUSSION
This study replicated the findings of Experiment Three, 
in that mental practice could enhance performance of a task 
based on stored information. Contrary to expectations,
however, there was no evidence that the beneficial effects
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of mental practice depended upon the subjects capacity to 
manipulate visuo-spatial information, at least as measured 
by the Stickman Test.
In the introduction to this experiment it was suggested 
that this study would reveal the ability of the Stickman 
Test to measureRapacity that might be involved in learning 
this type of task. Results show that the Stickman Test did 
indeed discriminate between groups during initial learning 
on this task, which is supported by the difference in the 
number of trials to criterion between the high and lower 
imagers. It would appear from this finding that the
Stickman test does capture differences in imagery abilities 
that are part of the processes that accompany the early
stage of learning.
The reasons why variations in imagery ability failed to 
affect the extent to which subjects might benefit from 
mental practice are not clear, however, certain suggestions 
can be proposed. It is possible that Stickman does not 
measure the particular imagery ability that accompanies 
mental practice. Subjects may use a form of imagery which 
is not captured by the test. It should be noted, however, 
that a simple verbal form of encoding of the sequence for
this task is a strategy which is open to the subjects, but
reports from participants, as described earlier^ would 
suggest this to be unlikely. Moreover, for many tasks such 
as;f dancing, pole vaulting and swimming, verbal coding would 
be an ineffective, if not impossibleystrategy for organising 
such movements. The same seems to apply to the runway 
task. Work by later researchers such as Parsons (1987) has
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provided justification for the approach and ideas that were 
encompassed by the Stickman Test, Parsons'-^, states, 
"temporal and kinematic properties of imagined spatial 
transformations are strongly affected by the properties of 
the imagined object".
Overall, the present experiment indicates that imagery 
manipulation as measured by the Stickman Test does play a 
role during early learning, when the subject is attempting 
to grasp the overall framework of the task, but there is no 
evidence that it is associated with mental practice that 
occurred once the subject had prior knowledge of the task. 
As far as mental practice is concerned it appears we must 
look elsewhere to understand how it might operate within the 
movement generation system once the individual has prior 
experience with the task.
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Introduction
This final chapter reviews the experimental results in 
terms of the two ideas discussed in Chapter One, 'Motor Control 
And The Aims Of The Present Studies'. The first was that mental 
practice works by manipulating the sequential or symbolic 
component of a motor skill, thereby bringing about enhanced 
performance. The second was that such practice may be the 
process by which individuals prepare the motor programs prior 
to execution. It was also pointed out that there may be some 
difficulty in separating these two proposals. The
implications of the present results will be considered for both 
proposals, although it is recognised that these experiments do 
not allow us to discriminate clearly between the two accounts.
MENTAL PRACTICE AND THE SYMBOLIC LEARNING HYPOTHESIS
In the introduction to this thesis it was suggested that 
mental practice operates by organising the cognitive 
components, or sequencing of a task. Motor skills can be 
divided into two basic components, the cognitive or symbolic 
component and the motor acts themselves. The idea that mental 
practice facilitates acquisition of the cognitive aspect of a 
task is not a new one (Korrisett, 1967; Smyth, 1975), The 
cognitive element of a motor skill is thought to be the 
organisation and structuring of rules which govern execution 
of the movements. In the case of the runway task this is 
interpreted as learning the correct sequence, which is
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essential before the appropriate movements can be made. 
Furthermore, the complexity of this sequential information can 
be manipulated as was shown in Experiment One and by using 
this procedure the cognitive demands of the runway task can be 
altered. Results demonstrated that this task did reflect such 
differences in demand.
Subjects who are presented with the sequential information, 
prior to execution, and given the opportunity to engage in 
mental practice of that information show superior performance 
on the runway task, relative to a no-practice control group.
Moreover, such practice is almost as effective as actually 
performing the task, which was demonstrated in Experiment Two. 
Once the subject has stored information relating to the 
sequential aspect of the task, can it then be manipulated so as
to change the sequence of movements? Experiment Three
examined this question. A sequence of movement was learned 
and then the series was reversed, forcing the subject to make 
changes in the cognitive information previously stored. The 
results demonstrated that subjects who engage in mental 
practice can accomplish such manipulations effectively, 
relative to both a physical and no-practice condition.
The symbolic learning hypothesis states that mental
practice allows the subject to structure and organise the 
constituent movements of a task (Korrisett (1967). 
Furthermore, learning will only be enhanced to the extent that 
such factors are involved in the task. Jones (1963) and 
Summers (1977) have both suggested that the symbolic aspect of 
an interactive task is sequential in nature and the fact that I 
have been able to observe a large and reliable mental practice
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effect in the present studies may well reflect the sequential 
nature of these tasks.
Jones (1963) went on to suggest that the symbolic 
component of a motor task may be in the form of a 'kinesthetic 
image', and that mental practice facilitates the formation of 
such an image. Other researchers have also stressed the 
association of imagery and mental practice as an aid to the 
formation of a motor plan; Pear (1922), Start and Richardson 
(1964), Rawlings and Rawlings (1974). Hence imagery has 
become one of the most popular candidates for explaining 
mental practice processes. The aim of the final study in this 
thesis was to reveal individual differences in imagery
abilities and their possible relationship to the subsequent 
benefits to be gained from mental practice.
A new test of imagery was designed, (the Stickman Test) in 
the hope that it would measure individual differences in 
movement related spatial imagery. In Experiment Four those 
subjects who were rated as high imagers on the Stickman Test 
did show a  faster rate of initial acquisition on the runway 
task which supported the proposal that this early stage of 
learning may involve imagery in terms of spatial factors. 
However, this factor did not appear to affect the benefit 
gained from mental practice using the sequence reversal 
procedure. Such a result, however, does at least eliminate one 
source for the mental practice effect, in that imagery as 
measured by the Stickman Test is not involved in the processes 
engaged by mental practice.
Overall the symbolic learning hypothesis, if interpreted as 
the sequential and structural organisation that is involved in
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learning a novel motor skill receives support from this work. 
The association of this hypothesis with imagery, however, was 
not established. Some form of imagery may indeed be used by 
those who engage in metal practice but the exact nature of 
this imagery has yet to be revealed.
MENTAL PRACTICE AND MOTOR PROGRAMS
The second proposal put forward in the introduction was 
that mental practice gave subjects the opportunity to prepare 
the motor programs appropriate to the task. I shall approach 
the problem of developing an interpretation of this proposal 
by providing a theoretical account of the pattern of 
experimental results. By its very nature, any such account 
will be post hoc as the experiments were not designed to 
differentiate between the various theories of mental practice. 
I shall approach the problem of developing an interpretation of 
the results by first considering one possible explanation of 
the simple acquisition of the runway task and follow this by 
discussing the points at which mental practice could act.
SIMPLE ACQUISITION OF THE RUNWAY TASK
In order to analyse the task I shall use a simplified 
version, consisting of two movements, such as a transition 
from two feet to the left foot, and from the left foot to the 
right foot. Furthermore, I shall assume that the subject comes 
to the task with pre-formed motor programs, pi and p2, that 
will control these movements. This is not an unreasonable 
assumption as such actions are likely to be highly practised. 
Within this framework I shall follow Fitts and Posner (1967)
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in assuming that learning under the trial-and-error, or no­
practice condition consists of at least two stages.
The Cognitive Stage
The subject must first grasp the overall framework of the 
task, which in this case means they must learn a particular 
sequence of movements and then execute them with accuracy and 
control. During the pre-activity phase it is proposed that the 
subject is constructing an overall plan which is needed to 
attempt the task. Within the context of this task the subject 
is presented with the runway and stands in front of the two 
start squares, where they receive instructions about how the 
task is to be achieved. Initial conditions and past movement 
experiences will contribute to the subjects' construction of 
their overall plan of action and once this has occurred, they 
can attempt the task.
When the subjects stand on the start squares their first 
problem is to learn the sequence of movements. Having 
accomplished this, they are in a position to execute the 
sequence without error. However, the subjects' performance 
would not be fluid and fast, as at this stage the movement 
generation system is involved in a number of transfers of 
control between an executive, which has access to the memory 
for the sequence and effector mechanisms (which execute the 
motor programs). Initially, the executive retrieves
information about the first movement required, and on the 
basis of this instructs the effector mechanisms to execute the 
appropriate motor program pi. Having run pi, control returns 
to the executive for information for the next step in the
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sequence. Once knowledge is accessed about the next
movement the second program, p2, can be initiated. Thus the 
second movement, a transition from a hop on the left foot to a 
hop on the right foot is achieved. This accomplishes the final 
step in this illustrative sequence, and there is no reason to 
suppose that for longer sequences these procedures could not 
be repeated.
This model describes the type of processes that might 
constitute the initial phase of performance on the runway 
task. The resulting performance at this stage would be full of 
'stops and starts' and be a very inefficient way of executing a 
series of movements along the runway. If the subject is to 
progress to a more skilled performance changes must occur in 
control systems to make execution more effective. In the 
introduction to this thesis the 'Gearshift' theory of control 
was discussed and it might be reasonable to assume that such a 
procedure might now come into operation.
The Associative Stage
Once the subjects have mastered the cognitive stage, they 
are now experiencing reliable execution of pi followed by p2 in 
sequence. This, I shall assume, is sufficient to lead to the 
construction of a new motor program P3 which, when called, 
will execute the two steps without a return of control and 
reference to the cognitive representation of the sequence.
The process, which I have outlined here, is in line with 
current thinking about the type of systems involved in motor 
control, in that they are by nature constructive. The question 
that we must now address, is where does mental practice have
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its effect and why might such practice enhance performance on 
the runway task?
An obvious point at which mental practice could act is 
during the initial cognitive stage of learning. The guided 
mental practice condition in Experiment Two enabled the 
subjects to learn the sequence, so that from the outset they 
could execute pi followed by p2 in order, thus allowing them 
to start constructing P3 on the very first trial of actual 
performance. There are, however, problems with this simple 
interpretation. First, one might expect guided physical 
practice to confer an even greater benefit during initial 
acquisition than guided mental practice. No only did the 
guided physical practice group have the same opportunity to 
learn the sequence they were also in a position to start 
constructing P3, by the sequential performance of pi and p2 
before the initial trial of acquisition. And yet guided mental 
practice was at least as good as guided physical practice in 
terms of error, in fact, significantly better in terms of 
speed, possibly the measure most likely to reflect the 
construction of a higher-order program (P3),
Secondly, it is not clear from this analysis why mental 
practice should be better than physical practice on the 
reversal of the sequence. A final problem with the idea that 
mental practice simply benefits the learning of the sequence 
concerns the fact that the advantage conferred by this form of 
practice was not affected by individual differences in imagery. 
On intuitive grounds one would expect imagery to make the 
greatest contribution to the sequence learning and there was
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evidence that initial acquisition is affected by the subjects' 
performance on the Stickman Test.
A more radical interpretation of mental practice is that not 
only might it aid sequence learning but also could allow the 
subject to start constructing the high—order program P3.
Thus this interpretation would argue that simply mentally 
executing pi and p2 in sequence is sufficient for the
generation of P3 (Schmidt 1982). Even this theory leaves us 
with the problem of explaining why mental practice is better 
than physical practice in bringing about sequence reversal.
SEQUENCE REVERSAL ON THE RUNWAY TASK
In attempting to explain the reversal performance 1 shall 
presuppose that the subjects have, to a large extent, 
forgotten the cognitive representation of the sequence and 
their performance is dependent upon executing the higher
order program P3. When faced with the reversal task the
subjects have to return to the cognitive stage and construct a 
representation of the reversed sequence. One way they could do 
this is by mentally running P3 until they get to the last step 
and remembering this as the first step in the new sequence. 
This procedure could then be repeated successively in order to 
determine the remaining steps of the new series. Once the
reversed sequence has been constructed and remembered subjects 
could execute the task by the switching of control between the 
executive and effector mechanisms, which in turn leads to the 
construction of a higher order program.
Given this analysis of the reversal processes the main 
difference between mental and physical practice is that the
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physical practice subjects have an explicit marker of their 
current location in the reconstructed sequence. This is, of 
course, their present location on the runway. Thus they are 
always in a position to determine the next step in the 
reversed sequence by simply running P3 mentally, until they 
arrive at their current location. This means that in order to 
perform the reversed sequence it is not necessary for them to 
remember the series of steps they have already executed. In 
fact, with physical practice the subjects could, in theory 
perform the reversed sequence without ever learning it, simply 
by repetitive running of P3 mentally until they achieved their 
current location.
By contrast, the mental practice subjects are forced to 
remember each element of the reversed sequence that they have 
already constructed in order to determine where to stop the 
mental execution of P3, which specifies the next step to be 
added to the construction of the reversed series. Of necessity 
mental practice requires the subject to store information about 
the new sequence and this allows them to enter the cognitive 
phase of learning more rapidly than the physical practice 
subjects.
According to this analysis, it is the task demands of 
mental practice that confers its advantage in reversal 
learning, rather than any intrinsic benefit it has over 
physical practice on motor learning in general.
The theory of mental practice described illustrates how it 
might be involved within the movement generation system. Such 
practice is capable of enhancing performance during the initial 
stage of learning and continues to benefit the learner by
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facilitating the combination of movement elements within a 
sequence, which results in a smooth and fluent performance. 
The theory presented also proposes an account of how mental 
practice may intervene during transformations on stored 
movement information in order to generate a novel series of 
movements and influence high level organisational processes 
which are involved in the sequencing of movements. Mental 
practice appears to be capable of manipulating and 
structuring this information so making the government of
movements more flexible. Overall, mental practice can enhance 
learning due to its involvement in the processes which 
structure the movements within a sequence, once that sequence 
is known. It is the contribution of mental practice at this 
point which results in a more skilled performance of the task.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND APPLICATIONS
The main thrust of future research should be directed
towards discovering the range of tasks and the individual
characteristics for which mental practice is most effective. 
The task examined in the present studies was representative of 
a particular class of skills, that is those which have a
distinct sequential component together with the motor acts 
themselves. Mental practice may positively effect the 
performance of other types of skills, but this question has yet 
to be investigated. Much recent research has been directed 
toward distinguishing the nature of individual differences in 
imagined spatial transformations, with particular reference to 
the human body. The ideas involved in such work are closely
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associated with the individual's activity during mental 
practice.
The current studies of imagined spatial
transformations are centred around the notion that the ability 
to manipulate images is more object specific than had been 
thought previously. Work such as this may lead to an
understanding of the type of representations we possess about 
our bodies and our actions. Within this context, it may be
possible to advise individuals in a more appropriate manner
about the requirements of successful mental practice prior to 
the acquisition of a novel task or skill.
At the present time mental practice does have some
practical applications. Possibly the largest users of such 
practice techniques are sports coaches and physical educators. 
Indeed for many American and Eastern Block countries mental 
practice is an essential part of their training procedures. In 
industry too, mental practice may have a role to play in the 
future as a training procedure for jobs, especially those where 
machine operatives must learn complex sequences of movements. 
Finally, within the clinical situation such practice might 
prove to be a useful therapeutic tool, specifically in the area 
of physiotherapy (Richardson 1964). For people such as 
dancers and athletes, who through injury are forced into 
inactivity, and other individuals who may suffer temporary 
paralysis, such as stroke patients, mental practice could 
provide them with a means for facilitating the recovery of 
movement.
— 93 —
F U
ADAMS, J.A. (197)
( (4 sr<L/ 
§ c > t t  f. L ^  r î 7 &
A closed-loop theory of motor 
learning,
,3(2), 111-149.
AMMONS, R.8. (1951) Effects of pre-practice on rotary pursuit 
performance, Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 41. 187-189,
ANASTASI, A. (1961) Macmillan & Co,,
New York.
BARTLETT, F.C, (1958) 
BILDEAU, E.A, (1969)
IhinLIng. London, Unwin, 
(Ed)
Academic Press, New York,
BOLE, R, (1976) Post K,R, delay intervals and mental 
practice. A test of Adam's closed loop
BRYAN, W.Y, and Harter, N, 
(1899) Studies on the telegraphic language. The 
acquisition of a hierarchy of habits,
6, 345-375,
CHOMSKY, N. (1972) 
CORBIN, C.B. (1967)
Mouton, The Hague,
The effects of covert rehersal on the 
development of a complex motor skill, 
Journal.of.,.6eneFal_Piycho.logy, 76,143-150,
CORBIN, C.B. (1972) Mental Practice,
Muimlar.ffidorrttinio. Ed, W,P, Morgan 
Academic Pres, New York,
- 94 -
CORBIN, C.B. (a) (1967) Effect of mental practice on skill 
development after controlled practice, 
Êê5SiLCliJluâiiÊLLy^38, 534-538,
CORBIN, C.B, (b) (1967) The effects of covert rehearsal on the 
development of a complex motor skill,
143-150,
DICKINSON, S,C, (1978) Mental practice of a complex 
perceptual motor skill. 
Movement Studies.4, 102-107,
ER6ST0M, B.H, (1964) Effects of an emphasis on conceptualising 
techniques during early learning of a 
gross motor skill, Research Quanterly... 
35(4), 473-481,
FITTS, P.M. and POSNER, M,I,
(1967) Belmonts, Calif,
Brooks/Cole,
FLEISHMAN, M,A, (1950) A relationship between incentive 
motivation and ability level in psycho­
motor performance. Journal of 
Expe.riiü£nt.a.LP.syc.ho.l.ogy.,. 41 ,...63:67.,.
GENTILE, A.M. (1972) A working model of skill acquisition with 
application to teaching,
3-23,
, R.A. (1950) An experiment correlating the nature of 
imagery with performance on a test of 
reversal perspective,
Qjisychadogy, 41, 3-67,
HINDE, R.A,(1966) Animal Behaviour, A synthesis of 
ethology and comparative psychology, 
McGraw-Hill, London,
- 95 -
JACOBSON, E, 0 9 3 2 ) Electrophysiology of mental activities, 
AE£ikaiUouuia]_oi_£iyxtioIogy, 44, 677- 
694,
JOHNSON, G,B, 093 2 ) Physical skill test for sectioning classes 
into homogeneous groups, Research 
Quaii£lll,3 128-136,
JONES, J.6 , 0  965) Motor learning without demonstration of 
physical practice under two conditions of 
mental practice,
36, 370-381,
KEELE, S,y. and SUMMERS, J,J, 
0  976) In Moio i J ontrol Issues and Trends,
Ed Stelmach, Academic Press, New York,
LASHLEY, K.S, 0917) The accuracy of movement in the absence of 
excitation from the moving organ, American 
J & u m L o f  .Psychology., 43, 169-194,
LEUBA, C, and DUNLAP, R, 
0  951) Conditioning Imagery, Journal of
41, 352-355.
LUTKUS, A,D, 0  975) The effect of imaging on mirror image 
drawing. Bulletin of Psychonomics 
Society, 5(5), 389-390,
MILLER, 6,A,, 6ALANTER, R, 
and PRIBRIM, K,H, 0  960) ElM5_ànd_tM . Structure of Behaviour 
Holt, New York,
NEWELL, K,M, 0  974) Knowledge of results and motor learning. 
Journal of Motor Behaviour, 6, 235-226,
- 96 -
NEWELL, K.M. Some Issues On Action Plans: Information 
Processing in Motor Control an Learning, 
Ed 6.E, Stelmach, Academic Press,
New York.
NOTTEBQHH, F. (1970) 
OXENDINE, J.B. (1969)
Ontogeny of bird song, 167.
Effect of mental practice and physical 
practice on the learning of three motor 
motor skills, Research .Quarterly..,
40, 755-763,
PARSONS, L,M, (1987) Imagined Spatial Transformation of One's 
Body, Journal..of Experimental 
Psychology; General, 116,(2), 172-191,
PEAR, T,H, (1922) Methuen,
London,
PHIPPS, S,J, and 
MOREHOUSE, C,A, (1969) Effects of mental practice on the 
acquisition of motor skills of varied 
difficulty, Research Quarterly.,..
40 (4), 773-778,
PHIPPS, S,J, (1968) Effects of mental practice on the 
acquisition of motor skills of various 
complexity, M,Sc, Thesis, Pennsylvania 
State University.
POSNER, M.I, (1967) Characteristics of visual and kinesthetic 
memory codes. Journal of Experimental 
Piyctiplagy^ 75, 103-107,
POWELL, 6,E, (1973) Negative and positive mental practice in 
motor skill acquisition. Perceptual 
and Motor Skills, 37, 312,
— 97 —
RAWLINGS, E.I. and 
RAWLINGS, I.L. (1974) Rotary pursuit tracking following mental 
rehearsal as a function of voluntary 
control of visual imagery, Psr.ceptual, 
and Motor Skills, 38, 302,
RAWLIN6, E.I.;
RAWLINGS,I,L,; CHEN,S.C.; and 
YILK, M,D, 097 2 ) The facilitating effect of mental 
rehearsal in the acquistion of rotary 
pursuit tracking,
28, 71-73,
RICHARDSON, A. (1987)
RICHARDSON,,A, (1964)
Mental Practice: A review and discussion. 
Part 1 (38) 1,
Part 2 (38) 2,
Has mental practice any relevance to 
physiotherapy?. Physiotherapy^
50, 148-151,
SCHMIDT, R,A, (1975) A schema theory of discrete motor skill 
learning, Pychological Review.,62,225-260,
SCHMIDT, R,A, (1982) Motor Control and leamiiig. Human 
Kinetics Publishers Inc,, Illinois,
5HAU, W,A,(1940) The relationship of muscular action 
potential to imaginai weight-lifting. 
Archives of Psychology,. 33, 1-48,
SHEPARD,R.N, and MET2LER, J, 
(1971) Mental rotation of three dimensional 
objects, 171, 701-703,
SHICK, J. (1970) Effects of mental practice on related 
volleyball skills for collage women. 
R e s e a r c h  Quarterly, 41, 88-94,
- 98 -
SMYTH, M.M. (1975) The role of mental practice in skill 
acquisition,
199-206,
START, K,B, and 
RICHARDSON, A. (1964) Imagery and mental practice, British. 
M r s i l f i f . EducatioiiaLPsYrhsiugy.^
34, 280-284,
START, K,B, (1964) Kinethesis and mental practice, 
Quarterly. 35, 316-320,
STEBBINS, R.H, (1968) A comparison of the effects of physical 
and mental practice in learning a motor, 
skill. Research Quarterly, 39, 714-720.
STEEL, W,I, (1952) The effect of mental practice on the 
acquisition of a motor skill. Journal. 
of Physical Education, 44, 101-108,
SUINN, R,N, (1970) Visuo-Botor behaviour rehearsal for 
adaptaive behaviour. Behavioural 
Councelling Methods, Krumbolz and 
Thoreman,
SUMMERS, J.J. (1977) Adjustments to redundancy in reaction 
time; A comparison of three learning 
methods, Acta Psycho logira^ 41 (3),
TAUB, E, and BERMAN, A.J,
(1968) In Neur.Qphysio.logy .of .Spatially. 
Oriented Behaviour. S,F, Freeman 
(Ed) Dorsey Homewood, Illinois,
THÜRSTQNE, L,L, and 
THÜRSTONE, 6,L, (1941) Factorial studies of intelligence. 
University of Chicago, Illinois,
- 99 -
iVLVING, E, (1962) Subjective organisation in free-recall 
of “unrelated" words, Psvcholooi 
E ê H S S L Î I ,  2)9-237,
TURVEY, M, (1575) Preliminaries to a theory of action with 
reference to vision. Haskins Lab, Status 
Report Of Speech Research, SR-41,
TWINNING, W,E, ( 1949) Mental and physical practice in learning 
a motor skill, Research Quarteily^
20, 432-435,
ULICH, E, (1967) Some experiments on the function of mental 
training on the acquisition of motor 
skills. Ergonomics^ 10 (4), 411-419,
VANDELL, R.A.; DAVIS, R,A. and 
CLU6STDN, H.A, ( 1943) The function of mental practice in the 
acquisition of motor skills. The Journal 
29, 243-250,
WHITEHEAD, J, (1974) The effect of mental rehearsal and mental 
preparation on performance, confidence and 
motivation in trampolining, British 
Proceedings of Sports PsYcholoqyJ48-153
WILLIAMS, D, (1976) The deep structures of dance. Journal of. 
Human Movement Studies^. 2 (2),
WILLIAMS, I,D, and 
RODNEY, M, (1978) Intrinsic feedback interpolation and the 
closed-loop theory, 
behaviour, 10 (1), 25-36,
WILLIAMS, D,M, (1964) The origin of flight motor command in 
grasshoppers, In .NeuralJhmry_and. 
Modelling^ Ed. R,R,Reiss, Stanford Univ,
100-
WOODWORTH, R.S, (1899) The accuracy of voluntary Bovemsnt,
(3) 3.
WRISBERB, C.A. and 
RAGSDALE, M,R, (1979) Cognitive demand and practice level; 
Factors in the mental rehearsal of motor 
skills, Journal of Human Movement S tudies. 
(5), 4.
-101-

PAGE NUMBER
FIGURE 1 Hierarchy of a badminton smash,
FIGURE 2 The ball-throw task situation,
FIGURE 3 Dickinson 1978 - Overall performance
of the various groups,
FIGURE 4 Dickinson 1978 - Bins correct for all
the various groups,
FIGURE 5 Two examples of Johnson's task,
FIGURE 6 Experiment One, The two sequences used,
FIGURE 7 Experiment One, Mean number of error for
all the various groups.
FIGURE 8 Experiment One, Mean number of errors
for all groups as a function of the 
serial position curve,
FIGURE 9 Experiment One, Mean speed of the
various groups,
FIGURE 10 Experiment One, Mean performance
ratings of the various groups,
FIGURE 11 The Runway (with guidance cues)
FIGURE 12 Experiment Two, Mean sequence errors
of the various groups,
FIGURE 13 Experiment 'Two, Mean speed of the
various groups,
FIGURE 14 Experiment Two, Fluency scores for all
the various groups,
FIGURE 15 Experiment Three, Mean sequence errors
for all the various groups,
FIGURE 16 Experiment Three, Mean speed of all the
various groups,
FIGURE 17 Items from Flags Test and Stickman Test,
FIGURE 18 Experiment Four, Number of correct items
completed on Flags and Stickman Tests,
14
31
32
32
45
47
49
50
50
50
54
56
57
58 
65
65
75
76
FIGURE 19 Experiment Four. Relationship between
the number of correct items completed in
the two halves of Stickman Test, 76
FIGURE 20 Experiment Five, Mean number of errors
for all the various groups, 79
FIGURE 21 Experiment Five, Mean speed of all
the various groups, 80
EXI=*ER I TyCETSTT 03STE
E m m
EM IÜB_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ss_ _ _ _ _ df iis
Task Difficulty (D) 231,41 1 231,42 20,80
Inspection Time (I) 136,02 1 136,02 12,21
D X I 45,71 1 45,71 4,11
Error 177,94 16 11,12 -
yithin.Subiects
Trials (T) 206,26 6 34,38 6,87
D X T 16,17 6 2,69 0,53
I X T 13,08 6 2,18 0,43
Dx I X T 13,08 6 2,18 0,43
Error 480,05 96 5,00 -
A
Vw ,
L%.
vTi;
TABLE B
BIKIBEB I IvTBITT 03STB
SEED.
FACTOR ss df ms F
Between subieiis
Task Difficulty (D) 767,98 1 767,98 12,14
Inspection Time (I) 25,62 1 25,62 0,40
D X I 90,72 1 90,72 1.43
Error 1011,42 6 63,21 -
Vi thin Subjects.
Trials (T) 109,61 6 18,27 8.47
D X T 31,68 6 5,28 2.45
I X T 21,94 6 3,65 1.69
D x I x T 11,12 6 1,85 0,86
Error 206,86 96 3.17 -
TABLE
E X B E B  I  3 Æ E 3 N T T  O I S T E
FLUENCY
ÎÈLM.  :_ _ _ _^ _ _ _ _ ss_ _ _ _ _ £lf_ _ _ _ _ 8ii.
Task Difficulty (D) 52,82 1 52.82 13,50
Inspect Time (I) 5,6 1 5,6 1,43
D x I 10,31 1 10,31 2,63
Error 62,57 16 3,91
VüiûJLSuMfiis.
Trials (T) 18,48 6 3,08 10.33
D X T 0,37 6 0,06 0,20
I X T 1,0 6 0.16 0.55
D X 1 X T 2.08 6 0.34 1,16
Error 28,62 96 0,29
TABLE L
EXBEB I DYCEITT TWO
S E Q U E N C E Ov er all A nalysis
EÊDinS_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ss_ _ _ _ _ (H_ _ _ _ _ bsl
E£k£.£iLSübiects
Stage (S) 64,56 1 64,56 7,97
Group(G) 65,62 2 32,81 4,05
8 x 6 49,76 2 24,88 3,07
Error 242,99 30 8,10 -
Within Subjects.
Trials (T) 71,08 4 17,77 15,95
S X T 13,63 4 3,40 3,66
G X T 28,37 8 3,54 3,18
S X G X T 20,66 8 2,58 2,31
Error 133,66 120 1,11 -
Separate Analysis -.Sequence
Group (G) 109,24 2 54,62 6,74
Error (Overall) 242,99 30 8,10 -
Late Condition
Group (6) 5,96 2 2,98 0,37
Error (Overall) 242,99 30 8,10 -
TABLE E
EXBEB I 3yCEIsrT TWO
FACTOR. ss AL ms
Be t v e e n  s u b j e i i i  
Stage
Group (G) 1039,49
S X G 386,91
Error 1923,46
594,35
Wi t h i n  Su bj e c t s
Trials
S X 6 X T
Separate Analysis Speed
2,09 1 2,09 0,03
2 5.19 8,10
2 193,45 3,01
30 64,11 -
4 148,58 29,17
32,53 4 8,13 1.59
74,28 8 8,13 1,82
45,24 8 5,65 1,11
611,23 120 5,09
ErnnB  _____
Group (G) 1352,06
Error (Overall) 1923,46
Late Condition 
Group (G) 230,15
Error (Overall) 1923,46
_5S_ AL
2
30
2
30
JISl L.
676,03 10,56
64,11
115,07 1,80
64,11
TABLE E
EXBEB I IvIEENTT TWO
E U Œ I
E A C M _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ :_ _ ss__ :_ _ _ _ d i_ _ _ _ _ _ _ is .
Between subj&ct s
Stage (S) 0.00 1 0,00 0.0
6roup(6) 23,82 2 11,91 3,05
S X 6 9,96 2 4,98 1.27
Error 117,16 30 3,90
Within Subjects
Trials (T) 20,63 4 5,15 17,07
S X T 0,81 4 0.20 0,67
6 X T 2,48 8 0,31 0,67
S X 6 X T 1.57 8 0,19 0,65
Error 36,26 120 0,30 -
TABLE O
EI>CBEB I M:E1ïTT TBBEE
TRIALS TO CRITERION.
FACTOR___________________ 55_________df------------- - f is ------------------ E _
6roups(6) 169,00 2 84,50 2,27
Error 557,00 15 37,13
Speed Last Trial Prior To Treatmenl.
FACTOR_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ as_________df----------------- fiS------------------ E _
Groups (G) 267,00 2 133,54 2,49
Error 803,73 15 53,58
TABLE B
EXBEB I BEICTT THBEE
FACTOR _ _ _ _ _ _ :_ _ 5 S _ ---------- df-----------_ fiS _
Groups (6) 18,28 2 9,64 4,71
Error 30,66 15 2,04
Within Subjects
Trials (T) 7,22 4 1,80 2,87
6 X T 4,71 8 0,58 0,93
TABLE I
EXIBEB I BElsTT TBEEE
SEEEH
FACTOR______________ SS______ ûi______ m _________E—
Between subjects
Groups (G) 2225.62 2 1112.81 3.99
Error 4182,74 15 278.85 5.25
Vithin Sub.iec_ts_
Trials (T) 880.38 4 220.09 4.15
G X T 321,22 8 40.15 0.75
Error 3182.46 60 53.04 -
T A B L E  jr
EXBEB I BEBT EOTJB
s m m E .
EACIÛfi- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -   s s _ _ _ _ _ _ _ d f _ _ _ _ _ E i.
Training (T) 31.00 1 31.00 4,41
Imagery (I) 6,00 1 6,00 1,14
TR X I 140,50 20 7.02
Within Subjects
Trials 38,86 4 9,71 4,39
T X TR 26,86 4 6,71 3,03
T X I 2,53 4 8,63 0,28
T X I TR 1,53 4 0,38 0,17
Error 177,00 80 2,21
TABLE K:
EXBEB I BElsTT EOXJB
S.P&£l
FACTOR _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ SS- - - - - df- - - - - fiS.
Training (TR) 1402,15 1 1402,18 5,00
Imagery (I) 4,73 1 4,73 0,01
TR X I 109,54 1 109.54 0,39
Error 5606,15 20 280.30 -
Within Subjects
Trials (T) 99,41 4 249,60 16,43
T X TR 40,93 4 10,23 0,67
T X TR X I 103,31 4 25,82 1.70
Error 1214,73 80 15,18
T A B L E  IC
EZ^ BEB I JVEEJSTT EOTJB
SpsM
FACTOR_ _ _ _ _   :_ _ _ _sa_ _ _ _ _ di_ _ _ _ _ us_ _ _ _ _ _ _ E _
Between Subjects
Training (TR) 1402,15 1 1402,18 5,00
Imagery (I) 4,73 1 4,73 0,01
TR X I 105,54 1 109.54 0,39
Error 5606,15 20 280,30
Trials (T) 99,41 4 249,60 16,43
T X TR 40,93 4 10,23 0,67
T X TR X I 103,31 4 25,82 1,70
Error 1214,73 80 15,18
T A B L E  O B E
LE^IOlSr OE EXBEB I  BEl^T TWO
GROUP PRE-TRAINING TRAINING TEST
(5 Trials) (10 Trials) (15 Trials)
GMP/L PP 6MP PP
6PP/L PP GPP PP
NP/L PP NP PP
6MP - GMP PP
6PP - 6PP PP
NP - NP PP
PP = Physical Practice; 6PP = Guided Physical Practice;
6MP = Guided Mental Practice;NP = No Practice,
